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ABSTRACT

Mood congruent m e m o r y (M C M ) in depressed
individuals, tends to be biased toward memories
consistent with their mood, i.e. negative or unpleasant
memories.

Although MCM is a robust finding

(cf.

Blaney, 1986), the large majority of studies have used
free-recall paradigms, and that methodology does little
to delineate the cognitive mechanisms determining MCM.
This study was designed to investigate whether MCM bias
is a function of implicit or explicit memory.

Implicit

memory is taken as a measure of the organization or
strength of association of the aspects of a memory
representation, whereas explicit memory also taps
elaboration that may involve control procedures such as
retrieval strategies.

Thus a comparison of implicit and

explicit MCM bias may provide important information
about the involvement of the structure of the memory
representation, or the involvement of elaboration
processes in MCM.
Two groups, a group of clinical depressives and a
comparison group, were studied.

Each group engaged in

an encoding task involving words of varying affective
valence.

Following this encoding task, all subjects

engaged in an explicit memory task (cued recall), and an
implicit memory test (word completion).

vi i

As expected, a

MCM bias was found in explicit memory, however, contrary
to predictions, no MCM bias was found in implicit
memory.

This finding was interpreted as supporting the

involvement of elaborative mechanisms in MCM.

A second

finding showed that MCM was found with depression items
but not with physical threat words.

Thus, the MCM bias

in explicit memory is somewhat specific to information
that is congruent with depression rather than to all
negativistic information.

IMPLICIT VERSUS EXPLICIT MEMORY BIAS IN DEPRESSION

Clinical depression is a pervasive and serious
affective disorder (Amenson & Lewinsohn,

1979; Lehman,

1971; Miles, 1977; National Institute of Mental Health,
1970).

Some have observed cognitive distortions or

negativistic automatic thinking to be frequent
correlates of depression.

Aaron Beck (1963; 1964; 1967)

has proposed that this style of thinking is the crucial
facet of depression.

He submits that emotion and

thought are intimately connected and that if one has a
maladaptive thought about an event, this thought will
result in a maladaptive emotional reaction.
While it is true that negativistic thinking and
irrational beliefs have been found to be associated with
depression (e.g. Beck, 1967; Buchwald,
Peterson,

1986; Gotlib,

1977; Cook &

1981; 1983; Lewinsohn, Larson &

Munoz, 1978; Munoz, 1977), it has not been shown that
this style of thinking is necessarily a precursor to
depression.

This aspect of Beck’s theory has been

criticized in the literature (e.g. Coyne & Gotlib,
1983).

Lewinsohn, Steinmetz, Larson, and Franklin

(1981), conducted a large scale longitudinal study to
test whether a negative cognitive style may predict
clinical depression.

Their results showed that
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depression-related cognitions occurred concomitantly
with depression, rather than before the depressive
episode.

Other studies supported these results in that

cognitive distortions have been found to be the result
of depression rather than the cause (Hamilton &
Abramson, 1983; Persons & Rao, 1985; Silverman,
Silverman, & Eardley,

1984).

Though there is not strong support for negative
cognitive distortions as the critical etiological factor
in depression, this does not necessarily imply that
depression-related cognitions are only symptoms of the
disorder.

It is possible that while the negative

affective state tends to cause these cognitions, these
negative thoughts may in turn serve to maintain this
emotional state.

Research has shown that sad affect can

be induced by encouraging a subject to engage negative
thoughts such as "I have too many bad things in my life"
(Teasdale & Bancroft,

1977; Velten,

1968).

Also, the

Lewinsohn et a l . (1981) prospective study of depression
found that the extent of negativistic thinking predicted
duration of the depressive episode.

Beck has suggested

that depression should be treated by teaching the
patient to monitor and rebut their negativistic thinking
(Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979).

This treatment

approach has been shown to be very effective (e.g. Rush,
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Khatami, & Beck, 1975; Kovacs & Rush,

1976) and has

fared well compared to antidepressant treatments
(Blackburn, Bishop, Glen, Whally, & Christie,
McLean & Hakistian,
1977).

1981;

1979; Rush, Beck, Kovacs, & Hollon,

While it is true that the effectiveness of

cognitive therapy does not necessarily imply that Beck’
notions about the etiology of depression are accurate,
it is possible that cognitive therapy may be effective
by redirecting the depressed person away from negative
thoughts which maintain or exacerbate the depression.
Thus, it may be that these thoughts are important
depression maintenance factors and this explanation may
account for the success of Beck’s treatment with
depress ion.

Information Processing And Depression

While the cognitive therapy approach has claimed
alliance with information processing psychology (e.g.
Murray & Jacobson,

1978; Mahoney & Arnkoff,

1978), unti

recently their research bore little resemblance to that
of cognitive science.

Lately however, the information

processing paradigm has been applied to various
emotional disorders including depression.

Much of this

research has been organized around the approach of
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Gordon Bower and his associative network theory of
memory.
Bower’s model (Bower, 1981), which is also known as
the "spreading activation model" of memory, contains
several basic postulates.

First Bower proposes that

memory is composed of cognitive networks of associated
concepts and descriptive propositions.

Thus, various

memories are associated with each other, and with
descriptive statements about these memories.

Secondly,

each memory unit (i.e. memory) is composed of a cluster
of components entitled "nodes".

Bower goes on to submit

that "Each distinct emotion...has a specific node or
unit in memory" (Bower,

1981, p. 135).

"primitive emotion nodes” .

These are called

Each of these emotion nodes

is linked with propositions that describe events from an
individual’s life during which that particular emotion
is aroused.

These emotion nodes may be activated by

many stimuli, either physiological or symbolic-verbal.
Further, Bower states that when an emotion node is
activated above a threshold level, this node transmits
excitation to those nodes where that emotion’s specific
autonomic arousal and expressive behavior are
controlled.

Finally, the activation of an emotion node

spreads excitement throughout the memory structures to
which it is connected, according to Bower.

Thus, an

4
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emotion node will maintain activation of this emotion.
When an emotion node is activated this influences which
memories will later be retrieved.

Memory Research in Depression
One of the predictions of Bower’s theory is that
recall of information may be dependent on mood.

This

prediction is an extension of state dependent-learning.
Information that is encoded while the subject is in a
particular mood (or when this emotion node is activated
above a threshold level ) will be better remembered when
the subject is once again experiencing this mood than a
mood not experienced during encoding.

This proposed

phenomena is called mood dependent recall (M D R ).

The

hedonic valence (pleasant, unpleasant) of the
information is irrelevant.

All that is required is that

the same emotion be present at encoding and recall, and
the information received while first experiencing this
emotion will be more likely to be recalled than
information aquired while experiencing a discordant
emotion, regardless of the affective valence of the
information.
Generally speaking, research has not supported
Bower’s prediction of mood dependent recall (MDR).
his 1981 article in the American Psychologist, Bower

In
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reported some weak evidence supporting MDR which used a
laboratory mood induction procedure involving hypnosis.
Many studies investigating MDR have followed Bower in
using the laboratory induction of mood, frequently with
the Velten (1968) mood induction procedure.

In this

procedure, a particular mood (e.g. sadness) is
apparently induced and the subject is given verbal
stimuli to learn.

A contrary mood state (e.g. happy) is

then induced and new information is given to the subject
to learn.

Finally, the original mood state is restored

and the subject is tested for recall.
A few studies have supported MDR since that time
(Bartlett, Burleson & Santrock, 1982; Schare, Lisman &
Spear, 1984; Mecklenbrauker & Hager, 1984), but numerous
studies have found no MDR (Bower, Gilligan, & Montiero,
1981; Bower & Mayer, 1985; Bower & Mayer, in press;
Brown & Taylor, 1985; Gilligan & Bower, 1984; Isen,
Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978; Johnson & Klinger,

1988;

Leight & Ellis, 1981; Schare, Lisman, & Spear, 1984;
Wetzler,

1985;).

In fact, in Bower’s research which

originally reported MDR (Bower, Montiero, & Gilligan,
1978), the first two experiments found no MDR.

Mood

dependent recall (MDR) was found only in experiment
three, which involved an interference methodology.
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These findings have led Bower (1987, p.453) to
conclude that "mood-dependent retrieval using laboratory
induced moods is an evanescent and unreliable
phenomenon."

Thus, Bower’s prediction regarding MDR has

not been supported, and there may be other cognitive
processes responsible for the few positive findings in
this literature.
While the affective valence of the information is
irrelevant with MDR, it is of great significance to mood
congruent memory (MCM).

A second prediction from

Bower’s theory concerns this latter phenomena.
Activation of an emotion node, according to Bower,
results also in the activation of semantically congruent
memory units associated with this node.

Thus,

information that is consistent with the activated
emotion node is elaborately processed and easily
encoded, which results in better learning and recall.
Generally,

it can be said that the phenomena of MCM

in depression is fairly well established in the
literature.

Two basic research techniques have been

used to investigate this hypothesis both with overall
confirmatory conclusions.

The first research paradigm

involves the laboratory manipulation of mood.

In these

mood induction studies, several different induction
procedures have been used, the most common being

Mood Congruent Memory
Velten’s (1968) mood induction procedure.

Typically,

these experiments induce a particular mood state
(usually either happy, sad, or control), the subjects
are then presented with some verbal stimuli, and then
recall of these stimuli is tested.
Many mood induction studies have been conducted
which supported MCM (Bower, et a l ., 1981; Bower & Mayer,
1985; Bower et a l ., 1978; Brown & Taylor,
1975; Forgas, Bower, & Krantz,
1983; Riskind,
& Russell,

1984; Mathews & Bradley,

1983; Teasdale & Fogarty,

1983; Teasdale & Spencer,

Taylor, & Fogarty, 1980).

1985; Coleman,

1979; Teasdale

1984; Teasdale,

Only one study using the

induction methodology has produced supporting mood
jLncrongruence (i.e. information recalled tended to be
opposite or inconsistent with mood; Clark, Teasdale,
Broadbent, & Martin,
McCann,

1983), and three studies (Gotlib &

1984; study 2; Mecklenbrauker & Hager,

Seigal, Johnson, & Sarason,
MCM effect.

1984;

1979) found no significant

In the Clark et a l . (1983) study, an

unusually long period of time elapsed between the mood
induction and the recall task, and it has been suggested
(Blaney, 1986; Ingram, 1984) that in nondepressed
subjects sadness may decay rapidly and that these
subjects may even try to counteract the negative induced
mood, hence showing a bias toward positive mood
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incongruent material with longer delays.

Also, in two

of the three studies where no significant MCM effect was
reported (Gotlib & McCann, 1984; Seigal et a l ., 1979),
the trend in these studies was consistent with MCM.
While the volume of mood induction studies
supporting MCM seems convincing, there are several
notable problems to this experimental paradigm.

A

number of problems arise out of demand characteristics
of the mood induction methodology (Buchwald, Strack, &
Coyne, 1981; Perrig' & Perrig, 1987; Polivy & Doyle,
1980).

First, it is possible that subjects report that

the mood induction procedure is effective even when not
experiencing negative emotion.

A second problem arises

out of the potential for cognitive priming.

In

procedures such as the Velten technique where the
subject makes increasingly depressing or positive self
statements, this would seem to prime the subject to
encode that information which is consistent with the
experimenter’s previous instructions.

Also, many of

these induction procedures not only ask the subject to
attempt to experience the desired mood, they also ask
the subject to maintain this mood.

Thus,

in an attempt

to maintain the "induced" emotion, the subject may
attend to that information which is likely to continue
this mood, hence resulting in the mood congruent
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effect.

Finally,

in the study of depression, it is hard

to imagine that these induced moods are as extensive as
those observed in the affective disorders of clinical
proportions, or in the occurrence of negative emotions
in the every day life of nondepressed individuals.
A second technique used in the investigation of MCM
involves an individual-differences approach in which
subjects are divided into groups according to their
current depressive level.

For example, a group of

diagnosed depressed individuals may be compared with
nondepressed subjects with regard to recall of
information of varying hedonic valence.

Once again, the

literature is largely supportive of MCM using the
individual differences methodology (e.g. Bradley &
Mathews,

1983; Dobson & Shaw, 1987; Dunbar & Lishman,

1984; Finkel, Glass, & Merluzzi, 1982;

Ingram, Smith, &

Brehm, 1983; Kuiper & Derry, 1982; McDowell,

1984).

This conclusion should be qualified with several
observations.

First, most of these studies found that

instead of a bias toward remembering negative stimuli,
depressives more often showed lower recall of positive
stimuli.

Thus, it may be that depressives show a lack

of the positive bias that is typically found with
nondepressed individuals, rather than a tendency for
depressives to actually recall more depressive

1
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information than controls.

Whatever the case, it still

remains that depressives tend to recall proportionally
more depressive material than do nondepressed subjects.
Secondly, it is not clear what the exact nature of
the MCM bias is.

Do depressed subjects tend to recall

more depressive information than controls, or is their
memory biased toward all negativistic subject matter?
Conversely, do nondepressed subjects have a memory bias
toward all nondepressed information (including neutral
items ), or is the bias only with positive material?
Thus, a study is needed which includes positive,
neutral, depressive, and negativistic nondepressive
verbal stimuli.
Finally, MCM is more easily observed when the
information is encoded in a self-referent task than
other encoding procedures.

The self-referent encoding

task (SRET) involves asking the subject to rate various
adjectives as to whether or how well these words
describe themselves (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977).
Variations of this methodology either ask the subjects
to answer "yes" or "no" to whether the adjective applies
to them, or to rate the extent to which the word applies
to them on a Likert scale.
& Hemsley,

Some studies (e.g. Clifford

1987), have found that when a subject rates

various adjectives in an task that asks them to apply
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the adjective to another individual, no MCM is evident.
Thus, a significant problem with this methodology
presents itself.

The apparent MCM effect may not be due

to mood per se, but rather to the bias that depressives
say "yes" more often when unpleasant adjectives apply to
them, and hence these stimuli are more easily recalled.
Thus, more research is needed which uses other encoding
tasks in investigating mood biases in memory.
The individual differences experimental methodology
presents several additional problems.

First, because

exposure and recall occur in the same affective state,
it is not known whether the MCM bias occurs at encoding,
recall, or both.

Second, there are many more symptoms

of clinical depression in addition to sad affect.

It

may be argued that the MCM finding is due to other
aspects of depression such as neuroticism.

However, for

the importance of investigating MCM process in
depression, this individual differences approach seems
to be the preferred procedure as it largely avoids the
problems of demand characteristics and cognitive priming
discussed earlier.

Perceptual and Attentional Processes
Evidence has been presented supporting the notion
that depressives process self-related mood congruent

Mood Congruent Memory
information faster than controls.

The SRET has been

used to investigate mood congruent processing by
recording the time elapsed between presentation of the
query ("applies to you?"), and the subject’s response.
Not suprisingly, depressives endorse more mood congruent
items in the SRET (MacDonald & Kuiper, 1984), and mood
congruent adjectives are endorsed more readily than
other stimuli (Bargh & Tota, 1988; Kuiper & MacDonald,
1982; MacDonald & Kuiper, 1984; MacDonald & Kuiper,
1985 ).
The findings on the perceptual effects of sadness
are somewhat confusing.

Bower (1987, p. 445) states

that his theory predicts that
"A pleasant mood would prime and lower the threshold for
pleasant words - or at least,

increase the response bias

in their favor - and unpleasant moods should facilitate
the identification of unpleasant words."
This prediction is made because when an emotion node is
activated, words and concepts associated with this node
are easily perceived.

Bower (1987) cites several

unpublished failures to support this prediction, and
other research (Clark, et a l ., 1983; MacLeod, Tata, &
Mathews,

1987), has also failed to support this

prediction.

Several studies (Gotlib & Cane, 1987;

Gotlib & McCann, 1984; Powell & Hemsley,

1984; Small,
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1985) have found evidence of mood congruent perceptual
bias or at least a mood congruent interference effect,
however.
One may begin to sort out these apparently
conflicting results by studying the different
methodologies used in these investigations.

Lexical

decision tasks appear to evince no perceptual mood
congruent bias (Clark, et a l ., 1983; MacLeod, et a l .,
1987), while word recognition (Powell & Hemsley,

1984;

Small, 1984) and Stroop interference tasks (Gotlib &
McCann,

1984; Gotlib & Cane, 1987) do result in a

significant mood congruent effect.

Lexical decision

tasks ask the subject to decide quickly whether a
presented stimulus is an actual English word or not.
Thus, words and nonwords are presented for which
reaction times (RTs ) are recorded.

The prediction from

network theory is that RTs of mood congruent stimuli
should be shorter than those of other verbal stimuli.
This prediction however, has not been supported.
Word recognition studies present a word stimulus
that is below the threshold of conscious recognition of
the subject, and the subject is asked to identify these
subthreshold stimuli.

The interpretation of the word

recognition studies is confounded however, because it is
not known whether these studies are indeed testing a

Mood Congruent Memory

1

perceptual process, or merely a mood congruent response
bias.

For example,

it is possible that a subject in

this paradigm may glimpse a portion of the letters of
the presented

word (e.g. "inf_r_or" of "inferior") and

guess correctly because of a mood congruent response
bias.

While the mood congruent response bias is of

interest and is also predicted by Bower’s theory,

it

does not relate to the effect of mood on
perceptual/attentional processes.
The only
sad affect on

reliable finding related to the effects

of

mood appear to be from the Stroop

interference task (Gotlib & McCann, 1984; Gotlib & Cane,
1987).

In this methodology, a number of words are

printed in several different colors.

In this variation

of the Stroop task, the words used are of varying
affective valence.

The task of the subject is to name

the colors of the words as quickly as possible, and
response latency is measured.

These studies have found

that color naming of words printed in various colors was
slower for mood congruent stimuli (Gotlib & McCann,
1984; Gotlib & Cane, 1987).

This finding is consistent

with the predictions of Bower’s network theory.
Only a few studies have investigated mood congruent
attentional processes in depression.

One such study

(MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986) used a new method for
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investigating attentional bias.

In this procedure, a

dot probe occasionally appeared following the
presentation of a pair of verbal stimuli.
differed in hedonic valence.

These words

This probe was located in

the space vacated by one the two words, and the subject
was asked to respond to this probe as quickly as
possible.

Reaction time (R T ) measures were recorded,

and these responses were compared with clinical group
(depression, anxiety, and control) and affective valence
(social threat, physical threat, and neutral) of the
stimuli.

The assumption from this design was that if a

subject is allocating most of their attention to a
particular type of stimuli (e.g. social threat), then
reaction times to the dot probe should be faster when
the probe follows this word type.

This design has the

advantage of requiring a neutral response from the
subject (pressing a button), therefore, any observed
effect cannot be attributed to a mood congruent response
bias.

In this paradigm, network theory would predict

that reactions to probes appearing behind mood congruent
stimuli would be speeded.

While this prediction was

supported with clinical anxiety subjects, no attentional
bias was observed with depressed subjects.

While this

study used "threat" stimuli, and "threats to personal
self-esteem" would seem to be mood congruent for
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depressives, it could be argued that the use of purely
depressive stimuli may have produced an attention bias.
Also, this study compared threat stimuli to neutral
words.

Given the apparent asymmetry of MCM cited above,

it may be useful to look at positive stimuli as well.
It is possible that depressed subjects may not bias
their attention toward depressive stimuli, but rather
may direct their attention away from positive items.
Gotlib, McLachlan, and Katz (1988) conducted a
study which addressed these issues, and found results
similar to that of MacLeod et a l . (1986).

Mildly

depressed college students (scores greater than ten on
the B D I ) were compared with nondepressed counterparts
(less than five on the BDI) on an attention allocation
task similar to the MacLeod et a l . (1986) design.

This

study reported similar findings in that depressives did
not allocate their attention toward any particular
stimuli, while the controls actually allocated their
attention to the "manic" or positive stimuli.

Thus, it

may be concluded that anxious individuals tend to bias
their attention toward threat stimuli, nonanxious,
nondepressed individuals tend to bias their attention
away from threat words and toward positive stimuli, and
depressed individuals appear to show no biased attention
allocation regarding either threat or depressed words.

1
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Clinical Implications
Several theorists have argued that MCM may be an
important maintenance variable in depression.

John

Teasdale (1983) has written perhaps the most precise
version of this theory.

He argues that a depressed mood

makes negative memories (mood congruent) more accessible
for memory retrieval than other information.

More

probable recall of these memories causes the depressed
individual to remain sad which again makes predominantly
negative memories more accessible for recall, resulting
in a vicious cycle, depression and negativistic
thinking.

In addition, the tendency for a depressed

individual to remember negative events leads to lowered
expectations regarding adaptive coping behaviors and to
increasingly negative interpretations of their
experience, which tends to exacerbate the mood as well.
For example, because of MCM, memories of social failures
recur, leading to lowered social expectations for this
individual, making less likely participation in social
reinforcers, and may lead to negative interpretations of
their social experiences.
in Figure 1.

This situation is diagramed

If MCM is indeed a critical variable in

the maintenance of depression, learning more about this
phenomena could lead to improved treatment methods, and
perhaps help prevent relapse.

Mood Congruent Memory
Figure 1
Hypothesized relationship between depression, MCM,
and avoidance of adaptive behaviors

LOWERED EXPECTATIONS RE: OUTCOME
OF COPING BEHAVIORS

AVOIDANCE OF
EFFECTIVE COPING
BEHAVIORS (e.g.
social reinforcers)

INCREASED RECALL OF
NEGATIVE EVENTS

DEPRESSION
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The Process of Mood Congruent Memory
Earlier it was shown that in the case of
sadness/depression, MCM as investigated by free recall
methodologies,

is a reliable and robust finding.

However, very little is known about the variables which
determine this phenomena.

While Bower’s associative

network approach and self-schema theory have been used
as an explanation, empirical data relating to the
underlying process of the MCM effect are currently
lacking.

It is apparent that many processes operate in

free recall, and therefore other procedures may be
needed to investigate what is responsible for MCM.

Mood

congruent memory may be explained by several processes.
It is possible that MCM is due to perceptual or
attentional biases on the part of the depressed
individual.

Secondly, encoding processes may be

involved in MCM.

Retrieval strategies may also account

for depressed individuals recalling more negative
material.

Of course, it is also possible that

combinations of these processes contribute to MCM.

In

the following paragraphs, each of these possibilities
will be explored.
It is possible that the depressed patient biases
his or her attention toward mood congruent stimuli.

It

may be that the depressed person allocates attention to
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mood congruent stimuli, therefore rendering them likely
to be encoded in memory.

However, as discussed above,

it does not appear that depressives evince an
attentional bias.

In addition, MacLeod et a l . (1986)

could find no relationship between RT to the various
word stimuli (including socially threatening words), and
later recognition performance with these same stimuli.
Therefore, evidence to date does not appear to support
attentional bias as an exmplantion for MCM.
A second, perhaps more likely, possibility
involving attentional bias in depression is that mood
congruent stimuli distract the depressive from learning
other mood incongruent information.

This suggestion is

consistent with the findings reviewed above that
depressives named the colors of mood congruent words
slower in a Stroop task.

It is possible that these mood

congruent stimuli distract the depressive, thus
rendering the encoding of other information less likely.
Cognitive processes related to encoding processes
may also relate to MCM.

Mandler (1980) has suggested

that encoding may involve two processes,
subsequent elaboration.

integration and

This suggestion has arisen out

of research findings with amnesic patients.

Various

researchers have found that the behavior of amnesics may
be influenced by performing a previous task, even if
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they cannot remember that they performed the task, let
alone the details of the event.

This phenomenon has

been observed with several different tasks, for example,
writing the mirror image of a word.

A typical

experiment of this sort may involve having amnesics
practice writing the mirror image of various words.

In

subsequent mirror writing tasks, these subjects will
write words faster if they are words to which they have
been exposed previously in this task.

Amnesics show

this advantage, even though they report that they cannot
remember practicing writing these mirror images earlier
(cf. Squire, 1987).
Parallel results have also been demonstrated with
normals (cf. Jaccoby & Witherspoon, 1982).

The ability

for a task involving the study of some stimuli to affect
subsequent behavior, even though the subject may not
explicitly recall the task, has been called implicit
memory.

Memory that is directly accessible to conscious

recollection has been called explicit memory.
Henceforth in this paper I will refer to these two forms
of memory in this manner.

They have also been labelled

procedural and declarative memory (Cohen, 1984; Squire,
1983), reference and working memory (Olton, 1983),
expectancy and data based memory systems (Kesner, 1980),
and this distinction has also been related to Tulving’s
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(1972) division between semantic and episodic memory.
Generally speaking, these theories differ as to how
independent the theorists view these two memory systems
(cf. Jacoby & Witherspoon, 1982).
This effect of memory without awareness led Mandler
(1980) to propose two distinct encoding processes,
integration and elaboration.

Integration is assumed to

be an automatic process, which involves the activation
of a schema or memory structure.

This process is

assumed to be modality specific (e.g. auditory or
visual), and tied to the physical features of the
perceived information.

Because of the schema’s internal

organization, mutual activation occurs among the
schema’s components.

This activation produces further

strengthening (or integration) of the internal
organization of the schema.

Thus, according to Mandler,

integration relates to the actual structure of the
memory representation.

Activation, and subsequent

integration make a schema "more accessible in the sense
that it will come to mind more readily when only some of
its features or components are presented"
Mandler,

1984, p. 554).

(Graf &

Thus, a well integrated schema

will be more likely to be activated if some of its
components are presented to a subject.

For example, if

"loser" is a well integrated word schema for a subject,
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the presentation of "lo" will likely activate the entire
word, "loser".
While integration is assumed to be an automatic
process, elaboration is presumed by Mandler to occur
subsequent to integration and is subject to control
processes.

In cognitive psychology, control processes

involve what information the subject decides to process,
and how the subject decides to process this
information.

Generally, cognitive elaboration is seen

as the extent and degree of cognitive analysis that
information receives (Craik & Tulving, 1975).

According

to Mandler, elaboration, which involves relating the
occurrence of a word schema to its context, provides
associations to related words and concepts.

Elaboration

is not modality specific or tied to the physical
features of the stimulus as is integration.

While

activation and integration increase only the
accessibility of a schema, elaborative processing
increases both accessibility and retrievabi1ity.

Hence

the relation of integration to implicit memory, and
elaboration to explicit memory.
Free recall data tell us little about the internal
structure of the emotional information.

It is possible

that mood congruent information in depression is
structured like other memory representations but is much
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more elaborated.

According to Mandler’s framework, the

MCM bias with free recall in depression provides us with
no information regarding the integration or internal
strength of mood congruent memory representations.
Thus, a test of implicit memory bias in depression would
provide valuable information as to the internal
structure of depressed congruent memory representations.
As stated above, Mandler has suggested that
integration is an automatic process, whereas elaboration
is affected by control processes.

Theories explaining

MCM such as Bower’s (1981), strongly imply automatic
processes.

However,

it is possible that strategic

elaborative processes may be involved in MCM.

It is

possible that depressives may use some controlled
strategy in encoding stimuli that leads to a recall
advantage for mood congruent information.

It has been

found that free recall (as well as cued recall and word
recognition) are enhanced in semantic encoding
conditions, whereas semantic versus nonsemantic encoding
conditions has no differential effect with implicit
memory (Graf & Mandler,
1986).

1984; Mandler, Graf, & Kraft,

In addition to depth of processing, retention

interval, and modality of study-presentation also show a
different pattern of results in explicit versus implicit
memory (Graf & Schacter,

1987; Greene, 1986).

These
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findings lend credence to Mandler’s proposal that
activation and integration are relatively automatic,
while explicit memory is subject to strategic
elaborative processes.

Thus, it is possible that MCM is

due primarily to strategic elaborative processes and has
little to do with the internal structure of the
emotional memories.
Evidence exists to indirectly support this
suggestion.

As noted above,

if the subject is

encouraged to relate the stimuli to him or herself, the
MCM effect was more likely to be found.

If MCM is .

operative in maintaining clinical depression and self
related encoding is required, then it must be posited
that depressives tend to excessively relate stimuli to
themselves.

This process is similar to Beck’s suggested

cognitive distortion of personalization (Beck, et a l . ,
1979), and internal attributions suggested by Seiigman’s
reformulated learned helplessness theory of depression
(Seligman,

(Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale,

1978).

In

Lewinsohn’s recent integrative theory of depression,
self-focused attention is also afforded an important
role (Lewinsohn, Hoberman, Teri, & Hautzinger,

1985).

Limited research (Ingram, Lumry, Cruet, & Sieber, 1987),
has supported the notion that depressives are more given
to self-focused attention.

Thus, it may be that both
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depressed individuals and subjects who have been induced
to feel sad are likely to encode items in a self
referent manner.

This proposal implies that depressives

often elaborate mood congruent information, but does not
necessarily imply any differences in the integration
process itself.
If Bower’s proposals are correct, then one would
expect that the individual in whom mood has activated
congruent memory structures, many associations would be
produced with mood congruent stimuli.

If the depressed

individual does yjroduce these mood congruent
associations due to spreading activation, then these
associations should benefit not only encoding but recall
as well.

Thus, it is possible that the MCM effect is

due primarily to a retrieval bias and may have 1ittle to
do with encoding.
Ingram (1988) has argued that studies which use
incidental recall paradigms (such as the SRET ) test
automatic processes in memory.

He argues that MCM found

in incidental recall studies indicates an automatic
encoding process because the subject is not told at
encoding that they will later be asked to recall the
information.

However,

Ingram ignores the possibility of

retrieval biases that may be unrelated to encoding
biases.

In fact, evidence presented by Anderson and
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Pichert (1978), indicates that retrieval processes may
be independent from encoding processes.

In this study,

subjects were asked to read a story that involved the
description of a home from either the perspective of a
home buyer, or a burglar.

After asking the subjects to

recall the story once, they were asked to recall the
story a second time from the perspective other than the
one in which they had read it originally (home buyer or
burgler).

Results showed that upon second recall,

subjects reported information not

previously recalled,

and this was information important to the second
perspective.

In addition, they also recalled less

information that was important to their original
perspective.
This finding suggests that it may be inappropriate
to conclude that results from incidental recall
paradigms are reflective of automatic processes.
Evidence suggests that implicit memory is not affected
by a shift of perspectives at recall as explicit memory
appears to be.

Thus, a comparison of implicit and

explicit memory bias in depression would also lend
information important to the issue of retrieval
strategies in depression.
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Some have suggested that MCM is due to mood
congruent stimuli being unusually frequent stimuli for
depressives.

For example, words like "depressed",

"sad", and "loser” , are stimuli both heard and used
frequently by these subjects.

However,

if MCM were due

to individual differences in word frequencies, one would
not expect to find MCM
sadness.

in normals with induced

As reviewed earlier, MCM has been established

with nondepressed individuals who have been induced to
feel sad.

Also,

if individual differences due to word

frequency accounted for MCM, one would not expect to
find MCM with diurnal variations of mood, and one would
expect to find MCM in remitted depressives.

Clark and

Teasdale (1982) found that depressives tended to recall
more unpleasant memories when they were more depressed,
and Dobson and Shaw (1987) found that the pattern of MCM
memory changed upon remission of depression.

Thus, the

available evidence does not support a word frequency
hypothesis for MCM.

Problem
As argued above, data regarding the mechanisms
which account for MCM in depression is lacking.

The

purpose of this study was to investigate implicit versus
explicit memory bias in depression, and in this way
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investigate both the structure of emotional information
in depression (via integration), and the role of control
processes in MCM such as encoding or retrieval
strategies.

This study provides needed information as

to the processes Involved in MCM associated with
depression.
This study compared two groups of individuals, a
group of depressed individuals, and a non-depressed
control group.

All subjects were exposed to a set of

words of varying affective valence (positive, neutral,
depressed, and physical threat).

As suggested earlier,

inclusion of positive, neutral, depressed, and negativenondepressed verbal stimuli would aid in determining the
exact nature of MCM in depression.

Physical threat

subject, material (e.g. ambulance, coronary, stab, pain),
was considered to be negative-nondepressed information.
Subjects engaged in a modified SRET with these stimuli
that followed the design of Mathews, Mogg, May, and
Eysenck (1989).

In this SRET variation, all subjects

were instructed to imagine themselves in a scene which
involved each word.

Following this encoding task,

subjects participated in a choice RT task.

This purpose

of this task was to separate the experimental tasks of
interest.

Then all subjects engaged in either a cued

recall (C R ) task, designed to test explicit memory, or a
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word completion task.

The order of CR or word

completion was counterbalanced.

In the word completion

task the subject was asked to complete a three letter
word stem with the first word that came to mind.

This

procedure has been used as a test of implicit memory
(e.g. Greene, 1986; Graf & Mandler,
& Kraft, 1986).

1984; Mandler Graf,

This is a test of implicit memory

because there are no explicit instructions to recall
study items, but subjects typically complete the letter
stems more frequently with studied items than with non
studied (unprimed) words.

Thus, in Mandler’s (1980)

conceptualization, words that are completed in this task
are the most accessible, and hence better integrated, at
the time of testing.

Half of the letter stems in this

task were from words to which they had been exposed in
the SRET (primed condition), and half were the first
letters from words to which they were not exposed
(unprimed condition).

The unprimed condition was

included to control for response bias.
Following another' filler task, all subjects engaged
in the alternate memory task, either word completion or
cued recall.

Thus, the design of this study was a 2

(subject groups) x 4 (affective valence of verbal
stimuli) x 3 (type of memory test) mixed design.

This
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experimental design is illustrated in Figure 2 (p. 38).
The predictions of this study are listed below.
Hypothesis 1: It is predicted that depressives will
recall proportionally more negative words than a control
group in the cued recall task.

This finding is

predicted because of previous findings of explicit
memory bias in depression.

Because explicit memory

involves both integration and elaboration, the results
of the explicit task alone cannot determine the extent
of involvement of these two processes in MCM.
Hypothesis 2:

It is predicted that depressives

will complete proportionally more mood congruent word
stems from a list to which they had been previously
exposed in an encoding task than will control subjects.
However,

it is predicted that depressed individuals will

not differ from controls in their completion of mood
congruent letter stems from a list, of words to which
they had not been exposed.

This finding would indicate

that the structure of mood congruent memory
representations is more organized and more easily
activated than non-mood congruent schemata.

Also, this

finding would rule out a retrieval strategy or bias as
the sole variable accounting for MCM.
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Because the there were two different types of
memory involved, separate ANOVAs were calculated for
explicit and implicit memory.

For explicit memory, an

interaction between group and valence is predicted.

For

implicit memory a three way interaction between group,
test, and affective valence is predicted.

A thi'ee way

interaction would indicate that the memory tasks had a
differential effect with group and affective valence of
the verbal stimuli.

If, it is found that the depressed

group remember more negative words in the cued recall
(explicit) condition, but not in the word completion
(implicit) condition, this pattern of data would imply
that the mood congruent stimuli are the better
elaborated, but not necessarily better integrated than
are other words.

Thus, this finding would suggest

elaboration as the important mechanism in MCM.
however,

If

it is found that depressives recall

proportionally more negative words in the word
completion but not in the cued recall condition, this
pattern of data would indicate that mood congruent
stimuli are better integrated but not necessarily better
elaborated for depressives.

This result would suggest

that the structure of the mood congruent information may
be primarily responsible for the MCM effect.

Although

this is the result found in the Mathews et a l . (1989)

Mood Congruent Memory
study with anxiety subjects, this would be an unlikely
finding.

Because explicit memory is a reflection of

both integration and elaboration,

integration should

enhance explicit and implicit memory.

Thus, one would

not expect to find an enhancement of implicit memory
without an enhancement of explicit memory as well.

If

an implicit memory bias is found with depressed subjects
but not with controls, then an additional cognitive
mechanism must be posited (e.g. cognitive avoidance), to
account for the lack of an explicit, memory bias.
Hypothesis 3: Finally,

it is predicted that the

depressives will respond proportionally faster to mood
congruent stimuli in the encoding task.

According to

Bower, mood congruent concepts (in this case depressive
related events and concepts) have subthreshold
activation, and thus imagining scenes related to these
congruent stimuli should be proportionally faster.

It

should be noted, that this hypothesis is not crucial to
the basic purpose of this study.
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METHOD

Subjects
Two experimental groups were used in this study.
The experimental group consisted of individuals with a
primary diagnosis of unipolar depression, i.e. subjects
as major depression or dysthymia. This group was
composed of 17 subjects.

The diagnosis of depression

was confirmed through clinical interview (Schedule for
Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia; SADS ), and
administration of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI).
Individuals in this group met the criteria of a BDI
score above 19. Also, these individuals met the
diagnostic criteria for either dysthymia or major
depression as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, the third revised version
(DSM-III-R; American Psychiatric Association,

1987).

All diagnoses were confirmed by a licensed
psychologist.

In addition,

if subjects were not

interested in treatment, they were excluded from the
study.

Four subjects who met the diagnostic criteria

for unipolar depression were not interested in treatment
and therefore excluded.
The comparison group was recruited from the campus
at Louisiana State University.
consisted of 17 individuals.

This group also
No subjects in this group
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were experiencing any axis I DSM-III-R psychiatric
disorder.

Thus, the clinical interview served to

exclude any other psychiatric diagnoses.

Also, any

individual with a BDI score greater than seven was
excluded from this group.

Finally, this group was

formally matched to the experimental group for gender,
age (+ three years), and verbal intelligence (+ .5 s.d.
via the Shipley Institutes of Living scale).
The two groups were compared by analyzing verbal
intelligence and age separately with ANOVA to delineate
any group differences.

As seen in Table 2, no

differences were found between the two groups in verbal
I.Q., F( 1 ,3 2 )= 1 .79, p = .19, or age, F(1,32)=0.00, p=.97.
Of course, significant group differences were found in
the BDI, F(1,32)=148.47, p<.0001, and other state and
trait measures used in this study (see Table 2 for a
listing of means and significant differences).

Materials and apparatus
Clinical Measures
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck,

1978).

This

instrument has extensive normative data and therefore is
a valuable instrument to assist in diagnosing depressive
disorders.
good.

Psychometric data on this instrument are

Item-total correlations range from .31 to .68,
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and Spearman-Brown corrected split-half reliability has
been reported at .93 (Beck,

1972).

Test-retest

reliability for nonclinical populations is also
satisfactory (.75; Miller & Seligman,

1973), and as

expected are somewhat lower for patient populations (.49
after three weeks; May, Urquhart, & Tarran,

1969).

Correlations with other depression scales are generally
good, and the BDI has been found to be sensitive to
clinical change as well.

This instrument is found in

Appendix A.
Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophreni a
(SAPS;

(Endicott. & Spitzer,

1978).

This interview scale

was based on the Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC;
Spitzer, Endicott, & Robins, 1975; 1978), which is quite
similar to the criteria presented in DSM-III.

This

scale is valuable in that it covers the symptom content
of depression comprehensively, and has been used
extensively in depression research studies.
Psychometric data are available on eight summary scales
derived from the SADS (Endicott and Spitzer,

1978).

These subscales have been titled: 1) depressive mood and
ideation; 2) endogenous features; 3) depressiveassociated features; 4) suicidal ideation and behavior;
5) anxiety; 6) manic syndrome;

7) delusions-

hallucinations: and 8) formal thought disorder.
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Cronbach alphas for the eight subscales range from .47.97.

With the exclusion of the formal thought disorder

scale and the anxiety scale all alphas were above .79.
Thus, internal consistency is adequate for the scales
important for diagnosis of depression.

Inter-rater

reliabilities had interclass correlations of .82 to
.99.

Test-retest reliabilities at one week ranged from

.49 to .93.

Once again, all scales but the formal

thought disorder and the anxiety scales had test-retest
reliabilities above .78.

One may refer to this

instrument in Appendix B.
Visual Analogue Scale (VAS; Aitken, 1969) .

This

scale is a relatively brief scale, yet has psychometric
properties comparable to longer scales (e.g. Davies,
Burrows, & Pyton, 1975; Zeally & Aitken,

1969).

It

consists of a 100 mm. line with "normal mood" at one
pole and "extreme depression" at the opposite end of the
line.

The subject simply marks where he or she is

feeling at the moment on this line.

An example of this

measure is found in Appendix C.
Profile of Mood States (POMS; McNair, Lorr, &
Droppleman, 1971).

This measure provided additional

mood state information.

It consists of 65 adjectives

which are rated on a 5-point likert type scale.

Factor

analysis of responses to these adjectives has yielded
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six scales: 1) tension-anxiety, 2) depression-dejection,
3) anger-hostility, 4) vigor, 5) fatigue, and 6)
confusion.

The two scales of interest in this study are

the tension-anxiety (T) and the depression-dejection (D)
subscales.

This measure has also been found to have

adequate psychometric properties.

Internal consistency

scores (via the Kuder-Richardson-20) are above .90 for
both the anxiety and the depression subscales (.92 and
.95 respectively).

Test-retest reliability ranges from

.70 (T) and .74 (D) for 20 days, to .51 (T) and .47 (D)
for six weeks.

The POMS has been shown to be sensitive

to clinical change (e.g. Lorr, McNair, Weinstein,
Michaux, & Raskin, 1961).

Also, this measure has been

shown to change in various mood induction studies (e.g.
Pillard & Fisher,

1967).

Further, the various subscales

of the POMS have been shown to correlate with other
related measures.

This scale is shown in Appendix D.

Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ; Eysenck &
Eysenck, 1963).

This measure served as the trait

measure in this study.

The factor of Neuroticism is a

trait related to anxiety and depression.

Although this

measure contains three clinical scales, only the
neuroticism scale (N) was used in this study.

Internal

consistency of the subscaies of the EPQ is adequate,
ranging from .74-.85 (N=.84).

At an interval of one
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month, test-retest reliabilities range from .51 to .90,
with most groups scoring in the .80 to .90 range.
Further, the authors of this test have shown that N is
related to variables that are similar to the construct
of neuroticism.

The reader may refer to this inventory

in Appendix E.
Shipley Institutes of Living Scale (Pollack, 1942)
This scale has been used extensively for screening
verbal intelligence and has been found to be an adequate
measure for this purpose (Prado & Taub, 1966).

Validity

data for this measure are also presented in Pollack
(1942).

It is a pencil and paper instrument which

yields a vocabulary score and an abstraction score.

The

vocabulary score was used as a measure of verbal
intelligence.

A copy of this instrument is presented in

Appendix F.

Verbal Stimuli
These stimuli were gathered from various sources in
the literature (e.g. Derry & Kuiper, 1982; Gotlib,
McCann, & Katz, 1988; Mathews et a l ., 1989) and were
intended to represent depressive/sad congruent, physical
threat, neutral, and positive affective valences.

These

stimuli were then normed with 50 undergraduate students
at Louisiana State University.

These students made
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qualitative judgments on each word as to whether they
were depressed, neutral, or positive.

Depressed words

were defined as words the subjects associated with
unpleasantness, and they were instructed that words
which involved threats to self-esteem or emotional well
being should be rated as depressed as well.

Positive

stimuli were defined as being words of a pleasant
nature, and neutral words were words that were neither
pleasant or unpleasant.

Subjects were instructed that

if a word had mixed qualities for them (i.e. both
pleasant and unpleasant features), that they should rat
these words in a "not sure" category, thus preventing
the inclusion of neutral words with mixed affective
valence.

Only those words with 70% agreement of rated

category were used in this experiment.

Physical threat

stimuli were derived from past research (Mathews et a l .
1989).

Words from each affective valence category were

balanced according to length and frequency using the
norms provided by Kucera and Francis (1967).

ANOVA

analyses indicated these words did not differ according
to length or frequency (see Table 1).

See Appendix G

for the for the final list of stimuli.
All of the words had a unique three or four letter
word stem.

In addition, none of the three letter stems

were common to the first three letters of any four
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letter stems.

For example, asse

both be included.

and ass

could not

For each of these words, there was at

least one word (not presented to the subjects), which
shared their three or four letter word stem yet was
higher in word frequency.

Also, there was at least one

word of greater frequency for every form of the stimulus
list words with essentially the same meaning (e.g. for
the stimulus "fail",

it was determined that there was at.

least one word beginning with the letters "fai" of
greater use frequency than "failure" as well as "fail").
These words were then divided into three sets (A,
B, or C ) consisting of an equal number of words from
each affective valence category.

Each subject was

exposed to two of the three sets.

This was done in

order that for each subject one set could serve as the
explicit recall set, one set as the implicit memory set,
and one set as an unprimed set.

The stimuli in each of

these three sets were also balanced according to length
and frequency as above.

Appendix H lists the stimuli in

their respective sets (A, B, or C ).

Once again, ANOVA

analyses indicated that these sets did not differ
according to length or frequency (see Table 1).

Mood Congruent Memory

Table 1
F tables and means for frequency and length data for
word stimuli.

Length:

Frequency:
Source

!

F

!

!

p

:

Affective valence,1 .07 ! .98 |

P

i

! .06 ! .94 |

.63 | .71 i

Set x Valence

;

! .51 | .68 !

! .17 | .85

Set

f

Frequency Means:
Variable

!

Mean

!

Positive

! 21.08

|

Neutral

| 23.86

!

Depressed

! 21.46

Physical Threat

! .11 I .99 !

Length Means:
!

Mean

!

6.92

!

|

6.38

|

!

!

6.92

i

! 19.50

!

!

6.83

:

Set A

! 24.03

[

!

6.84

j

Set B

! 21.31

|

|

6.75

|

Set C

! 19.09

!

!

6.69

!
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Response sheets
Response sheets were created for each memory task.
The cued recall task consisted of 32 three and four
letter word stems from one of the three sets of stimuli
(A, B, or C ) to which they were exposed in the encoding
task.

The word completion response sheet consisted of

64 three and four letter word stems that related to two
of the three sets of verbal stimuli (A B , B C , or AC), one
of those sets being the one to which the subjects were
not exposed to during the encoding task.

The order of

the words for both tests was pseudo-randomized, in that
there were no more than two word stems of the same
affective valence presented in order.

Apparatus
The Micro Experimental Laboratory (MEL; Schneider,
1988; Butler,

1988), was used to present the verbal

stimuli and the presentation of the filler tasks.

This

software program was used in conjunction with an IBM PC
or compatible.

This software system has received good

reviews (e.g. Butler , 1988), and has accurate timing
for RT experiments.
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Procedure

Preceding the experiments, all subjects were
interviewed using the SADS and were administered the
BDI.

From these instruments a determination was made as

to the appropriateness of the subject for the
experimental or comparison groups.

All interview data

were reviewed with a licensed psychologist.

If the

subject was deemed appropriate, he or she was scheduled
for the participation in the actual experiments.

Encoding Task
Each subject was presented with verbal stimuli from
two of the three sets of words as described above (AB,
B C , or AC).

Subjects were informed that this was an

imagination task and that they will be presented with a
number of words on the video monitor.

Each word was

presented for ten seconds duration, and the subjects
were asked to imagine themselves in a scene that
involved themselves and the word.

Subjects were

informed that they could think of a pa.L scene, a future
scene, or an imaginary scene.

Subjects were asked to

press a button when the;, thought of a scene that
involved thc,.iselves and the presented word.

After this

response, an instruction appeared on the monitor with
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the word encouraging the subject to continue to think
about this scene.

After the presentation of each word,

each subject was asked to rate how pleasant or
unpleasant the scene was, where 0=very unpleasant, and
9=very pleasant.
Seven practice words were presented, followed by
the 64 experimental words.

The first example word

"journey" was presented and the experimenter gave
examples of how the subjects might imagine themselves
involved with this word.

For example, subjects may be

encouraged to imagine themselves on a trip to Florida,
or a backpack in the Rocky Mountains etc.

Following

this example word, six more trial stimuli were presented
so that the subjects were comfortable with this encoding
task.
Filler Task
Following the encoding task each subject was
involved in a filler task lasting approximately three
minutes.

In this task, subjects responded to various

number or letter (nonword) groups and determined whether
these groups were numbers or letters as quickly as
possible.

Filler tasks were used in this experiment to

temporally and phenomenologically separate the
experimental tasks of interest (i.e. the encoding task
and the two memory tasks).

4
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Memory Tasks
The two memory tasks were counter balanced for
order.

Thus, following the first filler task, half of

the subjects engaged in the cued recall test, and half
engaged in the word completion task.

After they

completed one memory task, they participated in a
similar choice reaction time filler task as before, and
then were administered the alternate memory task.
Cued Recall Test: Subjects were presented with a
list of three or four-letter stems (see Appendix H).
They were asked to attempt to remember words from the
imagination task that began with these letters.
Subjects were encouraged to guess if they were not sure
of a response.

The amount of time a subject took to

fill this sheet out was recorded, but no subject was
given longer than five minutes to complete this memory
test.
Word Completion Test: In the word completion test,
subjects were given a response sheet similar to the one
used for cued recall, and were asked to write down the
first word that came into their mind that began with the
three letters printed on the sheet.

Subjects were

encouraged to complete this task as quickly as
possible.

This response sheet contained three and four

letter word stems from the primed condition (words to
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which they had been exposed in the encoding task), and
the unprimed condition (the group of words to which they
had NOT been exposed).

Once again, subjects were timed

as to how long they took to complete this task.
Following the memory tests, all subjects were
administered a debriefing interview which is included in
appendix

Scoring of Cued Recall and Word Completion
In most cases, the shortest form of the
used for the verbal stimuli.

word was

Words subjects produce in

the memory tasks which were of a different form than the
stimulus originally presented but were of essentially
the same meaning (e.g. "failure" for the original
presentation of "fail"), were scored as correct
responses.

A list of the acceptable responses is found

in Appendix I.
Statistics
Combining explicit and implicit memory tests in one
ANOVA is probably inappropriate because one is not
comparing similar measures.

Thus, the explicit memory

test and the implicit memory test were analyzed
separately.

In this case, a two-way interaction between

group and valance was predicted for explicit memory, and
a three way interaction between group, valance, and test
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(primed and unprimed) was predicted for implicit
memory.

If ANOVA re.su Jted in significant main or

interaction effects, linen planned orthogonal comparisons
were performed as described by Kirk (1982, p. 92-98).
Hypothesis three was analysed with a 2 (group) by <1
(a/‘feefive valence) ANOVA for RT.
interaction was predict, ed .

A significant:

II' an inter-action was found,

p]armed orlhogonaI comparisons were performed as
liesc;r ibed abovo .
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Figure 3
Predicted results for cued recall and for word
completion tasks.
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# correct words
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o
lower # words
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Figure 4
Prediction for word completion of unprimed stimuli.
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Group Differences:
The two groups were compared on the BDI, VAS, EPQN, and the Depression, Vigor, and Fatigue factors of the
POMS using ANOVA.

The purpose of these analyses was to

delineate group differences that may be important to the
interpretation of the memory recall data which were the
primary focus of the study.

As reported in the methods

section, no group differences were found for age and
verbal I.Q., thus matching on these variables was
successful.

Significant group differences were found

with other variables that one might expect to
differentiate depressed and nondepressed individuals.
Table 2 summarizes the results of these analyses and
group means for each variable.

As expected, the

depressed group scored significantly higher than
controls on the BDI, VAS,

EPQ-R, and theDepression and

Fatigue subscales of the POMS.

Comparison subjects had

significantly higher scores than depressives on the
Vigor factor of the POMS.

ANOVA for Order Effects.
As noted in the Methods section, memory tests
(implicit and explicit) were counterbalanced for order.
However,

it may be argued that the findings may be an
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Table 2

Means of Various Variables by Group

Group
! Depressed

Comparison !

F

p

Age

0.00

.97

26.94

26.82

Verbal I .Q .

1 .79

.19 !

16 .44

16.69

!

Variable

BDI *

148 .5 .0001;

27.53

3.71

!

VAS*

20 .08 .0001!

46 .24

11.53

!

Neuroticism* 39.36! .0001!

18.35

9 .06

!

EPQ

POMS
Depression*

102.9! .0001!

32 .53

4.88

!

Vi gor*

17.36! .0002!

10. 35

18.65

!

Fatigue*

26.06! .0001!

16.88

6.18

!

Note: * indicates that the two groups differed
significantly on this variable (p<.05).
analyses df=l,32.

For all above
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artifact of order of memory tests.

Therefore, ANOVAs

were calculated to determine the extent of the effect o
order, if any.

No main effect was found for order,

F(l,30)=.94, p=.34.

Also, no significant interaction

effects involving order were found.

Therefore, it is

unlikely that the primary findings of the study were an
artifact of the order of presentation of memory tests.

Hypothesis 1: Mood Congruent Memory in Explicit memory.
As argued earlier,

it is probably inappropriate to

combine two different measures of memory in one ANOVA.
Therefore, explicit and implicit memory conditions were
analyzed separately.

A test of sphericity was

calculated to determine if the probability of the
ordinary F test was correct.

This statistic tests the

hypothesis that the orthogonal components are
uncorrelated and have equal variance.

If this

hypothesis is not rejected, then the probabilities
provided by the ordinary F tests are appropriate (cf.
Freund, Littell, & Spector, 1986, p. 183).

The test of

sphericity indicated that ordinary F tests were
appropriate for analysis of explicit memory data
(Chisquare approximation (5)=8.64, p=.12).

As

predicted, a significant valence by group interaction
was found in the explicit (C R ) memory condition,
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F (3,90 )=3.92, p<.01.

Table 3 summarizes means and group

differences pertaining to this analysis.

(See Figures

5, 6 and 7 for a graphic presentation of these results.
Figure 5 illustrates the interaction between group and
valence for recall of only the positive and depressed
words only.

Figure 6 illustrates the results including

recall of words of all four affective valences.
Orthogonal contrasts showed that the comparison
group recalled more positive words than the depressed
group.

Thus, the expected MCM bias was found in the

explicit memory condition.

However, a group difference

was also found in explicit recall of physical threat
words.

Here the comparison group recalled more physical

threat words than did the depressed group.
Planned orthogonal contrasts indicated that within
the depressed group, subjects recalled significantly
more depressed words than either positive words or
physical threat words (see Table 3).

In the comparison

group, subjects recalled more positive words than
depressed words.
Because previous research has shown that
depressives generally recall less information than
normal controls,

it could be argued that direct
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Table 3
Means of Various Recall Measures by Group and Test

|
Group! Test
D
C
D
C
D
C

[Positive
I
a
! 2 .94
rv>
0 1C
|1
c
! 4.47
!
1.59
i r ime q.i
!
2.11
I
0.88
unprimea
I
1 .06

Valence
Neutral
Depressed
ab

be

!Physical
! Threat
a
3 .00

3 .18

3. 94

be
3 .88
1 .88

ab
3 .29
2.47

be
4 .06
1 .82

2. 00
0. 94

1 .94
1 .41

1 .71
0 .65

0. 94

1.35

0.47

Note: D=depressed group, C=comparison group, CR=cued
recall test.

Explicit test is represented by test of

cued recall (C R ), Implicit test is represented by primed
and unprimed word completion.

In CR condition, means

that share a letter are not significantly different.
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Figure 5

Interaction between Group and Valence for Positive and
Depressed Words.

5.0

D

4.0

Explicit
Memory
3.0

D

HITS
Primed
Implicit
Memory

2.0

1.0

Unprimed
(baseline)
0.0

Positive

Depressed
Valence

Note: "Hits" is the number of correct completions
on any given test.

The solid lines connected by ’D ’

represents the results for the depressed group.

The

dotted line connected by ’C ’ represents the comparison
group.
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Figure 6
Interaction between group and valence for words of all
affective valences
5 .0

Explicit
Memory

4.0

3 .0
HITS
D,

Primed
Impl ic it.
Memory

2.0

1 .0
Unprimed
baseline )
C
0.0

Positive Neutral Depressed

Physical
Threat

Valence
Note: "Hits" is the number of correct completions
on any given test.

The solid lines connected by ’D ’

represents the results for the depressed group.

The

dotted line connected by *C’ represents the comparison
group.
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comparison of means between depressives and controls by
valence may be misleading.

Therefore an additional

ANOVA was performed to attempt to control for this
general recall inhibition in depressives.

Difference

scores were formed such that for each subject their
explicit recall of neutral words was subtracted from the
number of words recalled for each valence.

Thus, three

different difference scores were formed for positive,
depressed, and physical threat.

For example, the

formula for calculating the difference score for
positive recall was as follows:
Positive CR - Neutral CR = Positive Difference Score

As expected, a significant group by valence interaction
was found, F(2,60)=5.9 p<.005.
Orthogonal contrasts of difference means showed
that depressives had significantly higher depressed
recall difference scores than did controls (see Table
4).

No significant difference was found between the two

groups in physical threat or positive recall difference
scores.

Within the comparison group, the positive

difference mean was significantly higher than the
depressed difference score.

Contrasts within the

depressed group showed the opposite pattern.

In this

group the depressed difference score was significantly

60

Mood Congruent Memory

Table 4
Means of Difference Scores for Explicit
Recall by Group and Valence
Valence
JPositive [Depressed
! Physical j
Group
!
__________ 1____________ {__Threat__ !
ac
b
c
Depressed
J -.24
[
.77
|
-.18
|
i |__
i____________
i___________i
!
I
I
ab
c
abc
Comparison
I_.59
I -.59__ _J_____ .18____ J
Note: Means that share a letter are not significantly
d if ferent.
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Figure 7
Means of Explicit Recall by Group and Valence

The means illustrated below represent the difference
between valenced and neutral scores.
.9
.8
.7
.6

.5
.4
Controlled
Recall
.3
.2
.1

0

I
^^ a.^ 4;
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J * * * * *

-.1

| 4*4*4*41
1 ~

*T* “

*T" ' r

-.2

-.3
-.4
-.5
Positive
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Threat

V A L E N C E
Depressed Group:
!*****!
Comparison Group: |_____ J
Note: "Controlled recall" is the mean number of items subjects
recalled in CR for a particular valence minus the number of
neutral items recalled.
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higher than both positive and physical threat difference
score means (see Table 4).
illustrate this interaction.

Figure 7 was formed to
This figure shows a more

symmetrical pattern of MCM bias than that suggested by
the uncontrolled recall means illustrated in Figures
and 6.

5

Some caution should be expressed regarding this

finding however.

Some have suggested that it may not be

appropriate to use difference scores with measures that
may be correlated (Cronbach & Furby, 1970).

Some

moderate correlations were found between explicit recall
of neutral items and recall of other affective valences
(correlation coefficients ranging between

. 3 3

and

. 5 5 ) .

Hypothesis 2: Implicit Memory B ias.
Contrary to the prediction, no interaction between
group, test, and valence was found for implicit memory,
F(3,90 )=0.46, p = .71 .

A significant main effect was

found for test (F (1 ,30 )= 5 3.47, p<.0001), thus
demonstrating priming.

A significant, main effect was

found for valence F (3,90 )=3.49, p<.01.

Here both groups

tended to complete more of the depressed word
completions, across both primed and unprimed
conditions.

No interaction was found between valence

and group (F(3,90 )= 1.01 , p=.39).
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Correlations between Implicit and Explicit Memory
To further investigate the relationship between
explicit memory bias and implicit memory bias,
correlations between explicit memory measures and
implicit memory measures were calculated.
types of memory variables were compared.

Two different
First, primed

implicit memory was correlated with cued recall for each
valence,

For example, positive CR was correlated with

positive primed word completion, neutral CR was compared
with neutral primed word completion, etc.

The

relationship of these variables is shown in Table 5.
Secondly, two types of memory bias scores were
calculated and compared.

For the explicit condition

recall scores for neutral words were used as a control
condition and this number was subtracted from the recall
hits for each of the other three affective valences.
Thus, a bias score was formed for positive, depressed,
and physical threat words for each subject.

For

example, the formula used for positive cued recall (C R )
bias was as follows:
Positive Bias = Positive CR - Neutral CR

Bias scores for the implicit condition were formed in a
similar manner.

However, in addition to using neutral

scores as a control condition, the unprimed word
completion score was also subtracted from each primed
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valence score to control for response bias.

For

example, the formula for the implicit bias score for
depressed words was as follows:
Depressed Implicit Bias = (DP - DUP) - (NP - N U P )

where DP is the number of depressed word completions in
the primed condition, DUP is the number of depressed
word completions in the unprimed condition, NP is the
number of neutral word completions in the primed
condition, and NUP is the number of neutral word
completions in the unprimed condition.
A second type of bias score was formed by
subtracting the number of positive hits from the number
of depressed hits.

Thus, for CR the formula was as

follows:
Positive/Negative CR Bias = Positive CR - Depressed CR

The formula for the implicit positive/negative bias also
used the unprimed scores to control for response bias.
Thus, the formula for implicit positive/negative bias
was as follows:
Implicit Positive/Negative Bias = (PP-PUP) - (DP-DUP)

where PP is the number of positive primed word
completions, PUP is the number of positive unprimed word
completions, DP is the number of depressed primed word
completions and DUP is the number of depressed unprimed
word completions.

The correlations of the bias measures
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Table 5
Correlations between Cued Recall (C R ) and Primed Word
Completion Scores for all Subjects.

Explicit Memory

Positive

Neutral

Depressed

Physic
Threa

Implicit
Memory

Positive

.03

-.03

-.11

.04

Neutral

.13

-.01

.13

.18

Depressed -.29

-.19

-.04

-.17

Physical
Threat
P-UP

-.18

- .18

-.06

.09

.02

.02

.03

.3 2

N-UP

.30

-.07

.08

.25

D-UP

-.10

-.21

.11

.06

.31

-.25

.31

-.22

PT-UP

Note: No correlations were stat ist icallv
significant (P<.05 ).

Correlations of intere:

are printed in bold type.

UP=unprimed 1

P=positive, N=neutral, D=depressed,
PT=physical threat
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Table 6
Correlations between CR and primed word completion
scores by group.

Comparison Group

Explicit Memory
Positive

Neutral

-.03

.03

.15

Positive

Depressed

Physical
Threat
.25

Implicit

Neutral

.31

-.03

-.04

.40

Memory

Depressed -.10

- .21

.05

.1 7

Physical
Threat

- .16

- .07

.01

.01

Depressed Group

Explicit Memory
Posit ive
Positive

Neutral

Depressed

-.21

- .21

-.08

.07

-.01

.22

Physical
Threat
-.16
.05

Implicit

Neutral

Memory

Depressed

-.32

- .17

-.21

- .49*

Physical
Threat

-.19

-.25

-.06

.21

Note: * indicates statistical significance (p<.05).
Correlations of interest are printed in bold type.
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Table 7
Correlations between Explicit and Implicit Bias
Scores for all Subjects

Explicit Memory
Bias

Positive

Depressed

Physical
Threat

Bias

.15

.20

.04

.30

Implicit

Positive

.04

.04

-.12

.13

Memory

Depressed - .21

CM
1

-.05

-.19

Physical

-.12

-.04

.09

-.08

Threat

Note: "Bias" is the number of positive hits minus
negative hits, all other variables are bias scores
computed with the number of neutral hits.

No

correlations were statistically significant (p<.05).
Correlations of interest are printed in bold type.
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Table 8
Correlations between Explicit and Implicit Bias
scores by group.

Comparison Group

Explicit Memory
Bias
Bias

Positive

Depressed

.12

-.08

-.17

Physical
Threat
.02

Implicit

Positive

21

-.22

-.09

-.03

Memory

Depressed -.17

-.17

.10

-.07

.16

.05

Physical
Threat

-.05

-.40

Depressed Group

Explicit Memory
Bias
Bias

Positive

Depressed

-.04

.27

-.46

Physical
Threat
.46

Implicit

Positive

.03

-.15

-.20

.01

Memory

Depressed

.05

-.31

-.39

.31

-.08

-.24

-.23

.33

Physical
Threat
Note:

"Bias" is the number of positive hits minus

negative hits, all other variables are bias scores
computed with the number of neutral hits.

No

correlations were statistically significant (p<.05).
Correlations of interest are printed in bold type.
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for all subjects and by group are found in Tables 7 and
8.

As observation of Tables 5 through 8 attests,
measures of implicit and explicit memory by valence were
not related in this experiment.

The only correlation

that approached statistical significance was in the
depressed group between the depressed bias scores which
were computed with the neutral words as a baseline.
This relationship was a negative one, the opposite of
what one would predict if implicit memory bias was
contributing to explicit memory bias in depressives.
Thus,

in this study,

if a depressed subject tended to

exhibit an explicit memory bias, she was not likely to
exhibit an implicit memory bias and vice versa.

Correlations Between Memory and State and Trait Measures
Correlations were also calculated between various
state and trait measures and the memory scores that are
discussed above.

These correlations are summarized in

Tables 9 through 12.

Because of the large number of

correlations calculated, a decision was made to set
alpha level at a more conservative level (p<.01).

In

addition, because two distinct but internally homogenous
groups were used in this study, most attention will be
devoted to significant correlations that show the same
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Table 9
Correlations of Recall Variables with
State and Trait Measures
Memory Variable

Correlations of state and t rai t
measures
I
POMS
1
BDI ! EPO-N! VAS! Dep Vi gor ! Fat

Positive variables
Positive CR

-.50* -.60* - .29 -.42*

Positive WC

-.01

-.27

-.17 -.30

.16

.31

Positive-Neutral CR

-.15

- .24

- .21 - .30

.22

- .18

Positive-Neutral WC

.07

.00

-.06

.12

.20

.03

Positive CR Bias

-.52* -.67* -.41* -.46*

Positive WC Bias

-.19

-.27

Depressed CR

-.06

.13

.15

Depressed WC

.34

.28

Depressed-Neutral CR

.34

Depressed-Neutral WC

.26

.03 -.25

.41* -.46*

.61* -.31
.12

- .35

.07

-.26

.15

.05

.24

-.27

.25

.39

.16

.12

-.35

.10

.26

.18

.27

-.18

.46*

-.44* - .08 -.33

.19

-.50*

Depressed variables

Physical Threat (P T ) Variables
Physical Threat CR

-.30

Physical Threat WC

.09

- .01

.04 -.08

-.21

- .12

PT-Neutral CR

.04

- .12

- .03 -.26

.03

- .24

PT-Neutral WC

.11

.19

-.18

.19

.34

.09

Note: "Positive bias" scores = positive - depressed
recall.
CR=Cued Recall, WC=Word Completion, and PT=
Physical Threat, Dep=POMS Depression factor, Vigor=POMS
Vigor factor, Fat=POMS Fatigue factor.
* indicates
statistical significance at the p<.01 level.
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Table 10

Correlations of Pos itive Memory Variables
with State and Trait Measures by Group
Correlations of state
!G !
and trait measures
;r :
!o !
1
POMS
!uj
IP! BDI !EPQ-N! VAS! D ep !Vigor 1 Fat
-.05
.07
.37 -.39
!D !- .42 -.23

Memory Variable
Positive CR

1c l .21 -.49
!d | .09

Positive WC

.2 7

!c !- .34 -.54

Positive-Neutral CR !D | .14 - .12

.04 - .48

.03

- .07

-.03 - .42

.29

- .30

.16 - .22

- .42

- .27

.23

-.06

.01

.02

-.20
- .3

Ic | .46

.03

.28 - .06

Positive-Neutral WC |D 1 .52

.37

.51

Positive CR Bias

-.05 - .08 -.16

- .28

|D | .03 -.27

-.01

.33

.43

.33

!C ! .30 -.44

-.11 - .43

.37

-.18

.33 - .38

.11

-.33

.02 - .09

-.34

.42

IC I- .04 -.52
Note:

.52

!c |- .32 -.24

!D! - .10

Positive WC Bias

.24 -.08

.03

"Positive Dias " scores = positive - depress ed

Recall.

CR=Cued Recall, WC = Word Complet ion , Dep =POMS

Depression factor, Vigor=P0MS Vigor factor, Fat=P0MS
Fatigue factor.
group.

D=Depressed group, C=Comparison

No correlations were statistically significant

at the p<.01 level.
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Table 11
Correlations of Depressed Memory Variables
with State and Trait Variables by Group

Memory Variable
Depressed CR

!G ! Correlations of state
]R|
and trait measures
J0 J
!U|
|
POMS
!P ! BD1 1EPQ-N
VASI Pep IVi£ori _Fat
!D J-.39 .06
-.04
.25 -.09 -.60*
IC !- .04

Depressed WC

[DJ.56*
!C ! .07

Depressed-Neutral

CR|Dj

.13

-.17
.20

.16 -.20 - .32___JLQ
.04

.36 -.28

.50

.17

-.31 -.36 -.08

-.24

.12

-.29 -.60*-.15

-.37

!CL^.30__.3 3 ___.40___ ..22.- .24__ J _4
Depressed-Neutral W C [DJ .55

.04

_________________ 1C!-.34__j_37

.23

.49 -.15

.75*

-.09 -.12 -.08__ ^08

Note: CR=Cued Recall, WC=Word Completion, Dep=POMS
Depression factor, Vigor=POMS Vigor factor, Fat=POMS
Fatigue factor.
group.

D=Depressed group, C=Comparison

* indicates significance at the p<.01 level.
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Table 12
Correlations between Physical Threat Memory Variables
and State and Trait Measures by Group

Memory Variable
Physical Threat CR

:g ;
!R!
!0!
!u

Correlations of state
and trait, measures

I
POMS
IP! b d i ;EPQ-NI VAS! Dep|Vigor! Fat
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Note: CR=Cued Recall, WC=Word Completion, PT=Phvsical
Threat, Dep=POMS Depression factor, Vigor=POMS Vigor
factor, Fat=POMS Fatigue factor.
C =Comparison group.
p< .01 level.

D=Depressed group,

* indicates significance at: the
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correlation pattern within each separate group.

Other

correlations that show significance across all subjects
but differing correlation patterns within each group,
will be interpreted cautiously.

The most consistent

finding was the negative relationship between the EPQ
Neuroticism scale (EPQ-N) and explicit recall of
positive items (see Table 9).

Cued recall (C R ) of

positive words and the positive CR bias were both
negatively correlated with the EPQ-N.

This negative

relationship was also evident in the within group
correlations (see Table 10).

The BDI was also found to

be negatively related to CR of positive items, as
expected.

Although this relationship did not hold in

the comparison group, within group correlations showed
this negative association in the depressed group.

It

seems that in this case the critical w’ithin group
correlation was with the depressed group, because of tin
low variance in depression scores in the comparison
group.

The homogeneity of varience in the comparison

group would lower any correlations.

The POMS Vigor

subscale was positively related to CR of positive words
and CR positive bias, however this result is somewhat
equivocal because within group correlations showed this
to be a stronger relationship in the depressed group
than in the comparison group.

Positive CR was
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negatively associated with most depression related
variables, as might be expected.

However, within group

correlations showed that in the comparison group
positive CR negatively correlated with the Depression
factor of the POMS, while there was no relationship in
the depression group between these variables (see Table
10).

Contrasting wTith this result, although a

significant negative relationship was found between the
Fatigue factor of the POMS and positive CR across
groups, within group correlations found this
relationship to be consistent in the depressed group,
but not in the comparison group.
Correlational analyses with all subjects revealed
few significant correlations with memory of depressed
items.

The one correlation that did prove to be

significant was between the depressed minus neutral word
completion score, and the Fatigue factor of the POMS.
Within group correlations showed this was still a strong
relationship within the depressed group (r=.75), while
no relationship was demonstrated in the comparison
group.

Thus, as depressed subjects report more fatigue,

they tend to remember more depressed items relative to
neutral items in an implicit memory task.
Explicit memory of physical threat information was
negatively associated with the EPQ-N and the Fatigue
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factor of the POMS.

The relationship of physical threat

CR with the EPQ-N appeared to be largely due to a
negative association in the comparison group.

However,

the negative correlation between physical threat CR and
the Fatigue factor of the POMS was found in separate
correlations invovling both groups.

A NOVA for Jn tru s_ions
In order to further investigate variables that
might be related to the explicit memory bias, an
analysis was undertaken to investigate the possibility
of response bias.

Incorrect responses on the cued

recall task were recorded, and two advanced clinical
psychology Ph.D. students and one Ph.D. rated the words
as to whether they were positive, neutral, depressed, or
physical threat.

Instructions for rating were done in

the same manner as rating for the original verbal
stimuli as described in the methods section.

These

raters were kept blind to the diagnosis of the
subjects.

Only words with unanimous agreement among the

three raters were used for analysis.

In addition,

neutral words were not analyzed since these words would
not contribute to an understanding of response bias and
mood congruent memory bias.
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Because of the high frequency of zeros in the data,
it was determined that a nonparametric statistic should
be used.

Thus, Kruskal-Wallis tests were used to

analyze this data.

No group difference was found for

positive intrusions (Chisquare approximation=0.00,
p= .98 ).

Similarly, no group difference was found fox-

physical threat intrusions (Chisquare approximation:.24,
p=.63).

However, a significant group difference was

found for depressed intrusions (Chisquare approximation
=5.80, p<.01).

Here, the comparison group a c t u a l l y had

more depressed intrusions than the depressed group.
These data are illustrated in Figure 8.
diagram,

From this

it is apparent that the data are opposite to

what one would expect if a response bias were
contributing to the explicit memory bias.

Hypothesis 3: React ion Times :
Prior to the analysis of R T , trial times with very
high or very low values (mean +3 s.d.) were eliminated.
Thus,

if the subject did not respond, i.e. they could

not imagine a scene in 10 seconds, this score was
eliminated from the analysis.

If for any subject, more

than 6 of the 16 RTs for each valence were eliminated,
this subject was eliminated from the analysis.
subjects met this criterion for elimination.

No
No main

78

Mood Congruent Memory

Figure 8
Interaction Between Group and Valence for Intrusions
in Cued Recall
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effects for group {F(1,32)=.02, p>.10), or valence
(F( 3 ,96 )= 1 .3 , p>.10.

A nonsignificant trend was noted

for the interaction between valence and group
(F= (3,96)2.14, p=.10.

As seen in Figure 9, subjects in

the depressed group tended to respond slower in
imagining positive, neutral, and physical threat scenes,
but tended to respond faster in imagining depressed
scenes.

All of these differences are small and were not

significant, so it cannot be argued that differences in
imagination RTs contributed to recall differences.

Pleasantness Ratings
As described in the procedure section,

following

the imagination task with each word, the subjects rated
the pleasantness of the scene they imagined.

These

ratings were analyzed by group and by valence.
Significant main effects for group, F{1,32)=4.9, p<.03,
and valence, F(3,96)=384.28, p<.0001, were found.

As

expected, scenes imagined wTith positive words were rated
most pleasant,

followed by neutral words.

Both physical

threat and depressed scenes were rated as more
unpleasant than positive and neutral words, and imagined
physical threat scenes were generally rated as more
unpleasant than scenes with depressed words.
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Figure 9
Reaction Times by Valence and Group
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Note: RTs are latencies of time for a subject to imagine
a scene involving themselves and the stimulus word,
finding was due to differential rating of pleasantness.
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The main effect of valence was modified by a
significant group by valence interaction (F(3,96)=3.82,
pC.Ol).

As illustrated in Figure 10, comparisons of

means indicated that the depressed group generally rated
the positive, neutral, and depressed scenes as less
pleasant.

Because the pattern of pleasantness ratings

for the positive, neutral, and depressed scenes was the
same for both groups,

it cannot be argued that the MOM

The interaction was found because no group differences
were found in pleasantness ratings of the physical
threat scenes, contrasting with the differences found
with the other valences as described above.
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Figure 10
Pleasantness Ratings by Valence and Group
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pleasantness of each imagined scene in the imagination
task where 10=most pleasant and l=most unpleasant.
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DISCUSSION

This s t u d y investigated the contribution of
implicit memory processes to explicit mood congruent
memory (M C M ) bias in depression.
previous research (cf. Blaney,
explicit memory.

Consistent with

1986), MCM was found in

However, contrary to predictions, no

MCM bias was found in implicit memory.

In addition,

correlation analyses between explicit memory measures
and implicit measures indicated no relationship between
the two.

Thus, it may be concluded that the explicit

MCM bias found in this study was not due to an implicit
MCM bias.
Using Mandler’s (1980) framework of implicit and
explicit memory, the current findings suggest that MCM
bias in depression is primarily due to elaborative
processes.

Reviewing Mandler’s formulation of implicit

and explicit memory,

implicit memory is primarily a

reflection of integration or priming.

Priming is the

extent the components of a schema (or words in this
study) have been mutually activated in the past.

Thus a

more integrated word will be more easily activated when
some of its components are presented.

Explicit memory,

in this case CR, reflects elaboration because
elaboration involves the association of the schema or
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word with other information in memory.

Thus, a more

elaborated word is more easily retrieved because of more
associations to other items in memory which results in
more ’memory handles’ or cues to assist retrieval.

As

reviewed in the introduction, this formulation of
implicit and explicit memory is supported by depth of
processing research.

If encoding encourages elaboration

(deeper encoding), explicit memory is enhanced, but
implicit memory is left unchanged.
Thus, the finding in this study of MCM in explicit
memory but not implicit memory, suggests the involvement
of elaborative processes in MCM in depression.

In other

words, for depressed subjects, depressive words were
better elaborated, and tended to have more associations
with other items in memory, than words of other
affective valence.

This pattern of data implies that

depressed words received relatively more cognitive
analysis than words of other emotional content, and thus
were more easily retrieved.

Conversely, positive words

were better elaborated for nondepressed individuals,
hence leading to recall advantage for words of positive
hedonic valence.
One may argue that the observed MCM bias was due to
a response bias.

It may have been that depressives just

guessed more frequently with depressed words, or
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controls guessed more frequently with positive words
leading to more negative and positive hits,
respectively.
explanation.

There are two reasons to doubt this
First, research in cognitive psychology

has shown that manipulation of response bias does little
to change most recall measures unless there is a high
degree of probability of guessing the correct response
(e.g. recognition; Erdelyi, Finks, & Feigin-Pfau,
Roediger & Payne,
1989).

J989;

1985; Roediger, Srinivas, & Waddill,

Secondly, the analysis of intrusions in the cued

recall (C R ) task contradicts the response bias
hypothesis.

This analysis showed that control subjects

had significantly more depressed word intrusions than
did depressed subjects.

Thus, these data argue against

the explanation that the MCM bias in explicit memory was
due to a response bias.
The pattern of memory bias in explicit and implicit
memory found here contrasts with that found with anxiety
subjects.

Mathews et a l . (1989), found that while

anxious subjects showed a clear implicit MCM bias, they
found only a nonsignificant MCM trend in explicit
memory.

This study found no MCM in implicit memory, and

a strong explicit MCM bias.

Correlational analyses in

both studies indicated that MCM biases in explicit and
implicit memory were not related.

Thus, it appears that

Mood Congruent Memory
depressives tend to process mood congruent information
extensively, while anxious subjects do not.

Conversely,

mood congruent memories are easily activated for anxious
subjects, while mood congruent memories for depressives
are no more easily primed than they are for controls.
This interpretation has some intuitive appeal.
While anxious thoughts are activated easily for anxious
individuals, they attempt to avoid dwelling on them
because of their anxiety provoking nature.

On the other

hand, depressed words are not activated any easier for
depressives than for nondepressed individuals,

but when

they are activated, these individuals tend to dwell on
these memories and process them extensively which leads
to better recall of depressive information and may
influence the depressives outlook on their environment.
This interpretation is also consistent with the
attentional bias data discussed in the introduction.
Anxious individuals tend to allocate their attention
toward mood congruent stimuli, but depressives show no
immediate attentional bias (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata,
1986).

There exists some data that suggests that

attended words are more readily primed than nonattended
words in implicit memory tasks (Eich, 1984; Jacoby and
Brooks,

1984).

Thus, one might speculate that the

increased priming of mood congruent information in
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anxious subjects may relate to an attentional bias, and
the lack of any differential priming in depressives may
relate to the lack of an attentional bias.

Clearly,

this speculation extends beyond known data, and the
relationship of attention bias to implicit and explicit
memory bias needs to be tested directiy.
At this point one may note the similarity of
elboration in Mandler’s framework, and the clinical,
phenomena of rumination.

It seems to follow, that if an

individual dwells on or ruminates about particular
information, then this information would be better
elaborated and thus be more retrievable.

Recently Nolen

Hoeksema (1987) has proposed a response styles theory of
depression.

She suggested that individuals w^ho tend to

ruminate in response to depressed mood will tend to
maintain the depressed mood longer and perhaps even
exacerbate the negative mood state.

These researchers

have presented some evidence in support of this
formulation (Morrow & Nolan-Hoeksema, 1990).

Thus, it

is possible that individuals who become depressed tend
to ruminate, and this rumination tends to be focused on
mood congruent information which results in the MCM bias
and the maintenance of depressed mood.

Future research

could investigate this notion further by manipulating
rumination similar to the methodology of Morrow and
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Nolen-Hoeksema (1990), and then testing for MCM bias.
The reader might note the similarilty of NolanHoeksema’s (1987) response styles theory of depression
and Eysenck’s (Eysenck & Eysenck,
neuroticism.

1963) theory of

In this regard it should be recalled that

the most consistent relationships observed with recall
were negative associations between recall of positive
vairiables, and the Neuroticism scale of the EPQ.

Thus,

it is possible that depressed mood may interact with
neuroticism or a tendency to ruminate, to produce the
observed explicit MCM bias.

Explicit Memory Findings

Several aspects of the observed MCM bias in
explicit memory should be discussed.

First, the effect

appeared to be more of a positive bias for comparison
subjects, than a negative bias for depressives.

As

noted in the introduction, this result is consistent
with the bulk of past research on MCM (cf. Blaney,
1986).

This interpretation of the data would suggest

that depression may decrease the retrievabilitv of
positive information more so than it increases retrieval
of negative information.

However, this apparent

asymmetry in the MCM effect may be due to the fact that
depressives generally recall less information regardless

Mood Congruent Memory
of affective valence.
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As shown in the ANOVA of

difference scores and illustrated in Figure 7, when this
general recall difference is controlled, a more
symmetrical pattern of memory bias results.

In other

words, the depressed subject’s MCM bias was a similar
pattern to the control’s MCM bias, but in the opposite
direction.

Thus, this study demonstrated the importance

of including a neutral word category in future studies
of MCM to control for the general recall inhibition
usually found to be associated with depress ion.
Second,

in this study MCM was demonstrated with

cued recall (C R ).

As stated earlier, most studies of

MCM used free recall (F R ) as the dependent measure.

The

finding of MCM with CR suggests that adding some memory
cues does not significantly change the MCM pattern.
The third finding of importance was the specificity
of the observed MCM effect.

Comparisons of means within

the depressed group showed that they recalled more
depressed words than physical threat words.

Conversely,

there was no difference in the recall of depressed and
physical threat words for controls.

Thus,

it does not

appear that the MCM effect relates to all negative
information.

Rather,

it appears to be related to words

more specific to depression.

This result supports

Beck’s (1967; 1972) theory regarding the cognitive
content specificity of depressive schemata, and Bower’s
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(1980) theory regarding differing emotion nodes in
memory.
Beck has suggested that depressogenic schema are
activated in depression and these cognitive structures
contain information related to the negative cognitive
triad (negative thoughts about the self, the world, and
the future).

Thus, the words found in the depressed

hedonic valence category in this study would correspond
to information Beck argues would be contained in
depressogenic schemata.

On the other hand,

Information

that is contained in schemata that are activated in
anxiety states include thoughts related to threat and
vulnerability (Beck & Emory,

1985).

The words found in

the physical threat category would correspond to this
schema.

Thus, the finding of a memory bias with

depressed words, but not with words of physical threat
corresponds with Beck theory regarding the content
specificity of cognitive schemata.
If mood is the primary variable responsible for
negative memory bias, then one would expect state or
mood variables to be related to MCM bias.

Thus, the

more severe the depression, the greater the negative
memory bias.

One would expect that BDI scores would be

most clearly related to a negative memory bias.
Correlation analyses across groups supported this notion
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only with positive recall variables, and within group
correlations supported this result in the depression
group.
This result appears to be inconsistent, with other
studies investigating MCM in depression.

Several

studies have failed to find a relationship between MCM
and mood state variables (Mathews & Bradley, 1983;
Riskind, 1983; Riskind, Rholes, & Eggers,

1982).

In

addition, Gilligan and Bower (1984) reviewed a number of
unpublished experiments conducted in their laboratory
and also reported no relationship between the extent of
sadness and MCM bias.

However, all of these studies

used mood induction methodologies to vary mood, and as
argued earlier, these induction procedures may not vary
mood to the extent as that found in clinical
depression.

Corroborating this suggestion, no MCM

association with extent of depression was found in the
comparison group, where extent of depressed mood is
assumed to have little variation.

In one of the early

studies of MCM (Lloyd & Lishman, 1975), depressives were
asked to recall positive and negative events from their
lives and latencies were recorded.

In this study, the

expected MCM correlation with recall latencies was found
which is consistent with the findings of this study.
Thus, one may expect to find a relationship between MCM
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bias and depressed mood with depressed subjects, but
will not be likely to find this association in groups
where depressed mood is not as extensive.
While the expected relationships were demonstrated
in correlations of state and trait varibles with recall
of positive information, expected associations were not
found with explicit recall of depressed words.

Thus,

the I'elationship between depressed mood and increased
retrievability of congruent information is not
completely clear.

It is possible that MCM is related to

some other aspect of depression other than depressed
mood.

As discussed earlier,

in the current study the

variable that seemed to be most ciearly related to lack
of recall of positive items was the Neuroticism scale of
the EPQ.

Thus, the current results replicate the

findings of Martin, Ward, and Clark (1983), who found
subjects with high Neuroticism score recalled more
negative information than those with low Neurotiscism
score.

This memory recall bias was found to be

independent of mood.

The Neuroticism scale is assumed

to be a trait variable different from the state variable
of mood assumed by most theorists to be important in
MCM.

It is possible that mood might interact with

neuroticism to produce the MCM bias.

Thus, future

research should attempt to tease out the impact of
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neuroticism versus depressed mood on MCM bias.

One way

of investigating this issue would be to choose two
groups of subjects based on high and low neuroticism
scores.

Then one could randomly assign half of the

subjects in both groups to a depressed mood induction,
and the other half to a positive mood induction.
Following mood induction all subjects would encode words
of various affective valences followed by a recall test.

Implicit Memory Findings

A significant differential priming effect was not
found between groups in the implicit memory condition.
Results from the correlational analyses in the depressed
group suggested that word completion of depressed primed
words was associated with state measures that one would
normally associate with depression (the BDI and the
Depression and Fatigue factors of the POMS).

However,

these relationships were not evident in the comparison
group, only a few of the expected correlations with
implicit memory measures were found, and it is clear no
MCM bias was found in implicit memory.
There are several possible explanations for the
failure to find an implicit MCM bias.

First, it is

possible that the implicit memory measure was
insensitive for detecting differential priming of
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information of differing hedonic valence.

However,

Mathews et a l . (1989) found an implicit MCM memory bias
with anxiety subjects using a similar methodology.
Therefore, unless the implicit MCM bias in depression is
weaker than that found in anxiety subjects,

it would be

difficult to argue that this methodology was insensitive
to finding an implicit MCM bias.
A second and related possibility is that it may be
more difficult for priming to be demonstrated for
depressed words because of the high completion rate of
unprimed depressed words.

Both groups correctly

completed depressed unprimed words more frequently than
words of the other affective valences.

Thus,

it is

possible that this high rate of unprimed completions
made it more difficult for differential priming to be
demonstrated for depressed information.

However,

for

this argument to be valid, one must also argue that the
rate of completed primed depressed words was insensitive
because of a ceiling effect.

The argument here would be

that since the unprimed rate for depressed words was
generally higher, this did not allow for further
improvement in the primed condition.

As seen in Table

3, mean priming rates for depressed words varied between
two and two and a half words out of a possible eight.
Thus, a ceiling effect seems unlikely.

All of the
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alternative hypotheses for the lack of finding an
implicit MCM bias seem unlikely.
Virtually no other studies have investigated
implicit MCM bias in depression.

Only one other study

has used an implicit memory measure to evaluate the
processing of emotional information in depression
(Segal, Hood, Shaw, & Higgins, 1988).

Although these

researchers found a significant priming effect for selfschema relevant words, affective valence of the words
was not manipulated so this study does not directly
relate to the current study.

Theoretical Implications

Currently, theorizing of implicit and explicit
memory in cognitive psychology is in a state of flux.
Several recent review's (McKoon, Rat] iff, & Dell, 1986;
Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988) have questioned the
activation/elaboration view of implicit/explicit
memory.

Most theorists who follow the implicit/explicit

distinction assert that implicit memory tasks activate
an abstract schema devoid of contextual information.
According to these theorists, explicit memory involves
elaboration which includes associations of the schema to
information of environmental context.

For example, when

a student is asked in a test to recall information from
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a lecture, she may use memory cues from the lecture in
addition to the information asked for (like anecdotes)
to assist her in recalling the needed information.
These memory cues would be an example of contextual
information that is used in explicit memory, but not in
implicit memory.
One of the most cited alternative views is the data
driven versus conceptually driven distinction made by
Roediger and associates (Roediger, 1984; Blaxton,
Roediger & Blaxton, 1987).

1985;

Data driven tests are those

tests where subjects are asked to primarily operate on
the perceptual information that they are given.

Thus,

most implicit memory tests may be seen as data driven.
Conceptually driven tests are those in which subjects
are asked to mentally reconstruct the study episode (the
episode in which the material to be remembered is
originally presented).
conceptually driven.

Most explicit tests are seen as
However, some explicit tests may

be seen to be as a combination of data driven and
conceptually driven tests.

For example,

in the CR task

used in this study, subjects were given perceptual
information on which to operate, but they were also
asked to reconstruct a previous episode with this
perceptual information.

The data regarding implicit and

explicit tests investigating linguistic and perceptual
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contexts appears to follow the data driven/conceptually
driven dichotomy more than the implicit/explicit
distinction.

For example, when bilingual subjects are

exposed to a word in one language, implicit priming will
not be observed in another language, whereas explicit
memory is not affected by linguistic context (for a
review see Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork,

1988).

Further,

if the type of letters are changed from study to test
then implicit priming is attenuated whereas explicit
memory is not.

For example,

if words are studied in

small case letters, priming is greater if letter stems
are given at testing in small case rather than in block
letters.

However, this change in letter type has little

effect on explicit memory.

These two findings clearly

follow the data driven/conceptually driven account and
would not be predicted by most implicit/explicit memory
theorists who assert that an abstract concept devoid of
contextual detail is activated in priming.
However, some studies (Cermak, Talbot, Chandler, &
Wolbarst, 1985; Diamond & Rozin, 1984; Graf &• Schacter,
1985; Osgood & Hoosain,
Graf,

1974; Schacter, 1985; Schacter &

1986; Schacter & Whitfield,

.1986) have found

results inconistent with the data driven/conceptually
driven distinction.

For example, this approach does not

account well for the finding that some types of priming
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(e.g. free association) depend on whether the phrase is
one in which the words regularly occur together.

In

such experiments a subject is more likely to complete
the primed association GREEN-______
than the primed phrase "green-book".

as "GREEN-PASTURES"
Additionally, the

data driven/conceptually driven distinction does not
explain why amnesics fail to show priming with
nonwords.

These and several other findings (cf.

Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork,

1988) are not consistent

with the position taken by Roediger.
Richardson-Klavehn and Bjork (1988) concluded their
review with the assertion that an adequate theory of
implicit and explicit memory must integrate components
of both the abstractionist and the data driven/
conceptually driven viewpoints.

In this regard,

Handler’s approach seems to be a useful integration of
the data driven/conceptually driven and abstract
activation/elaboration accounts.

Although Mandler’s

approach basically agrees with the activation/
elaboration account of implicit and explicit memory,
Handler does not argue that activation is necessarily
that of a abstract concept devoid of context.

As was

discussed in the introduction, Handler (1980) states
that activation/integration is tied to the phonological/
perceptual characteristics of the stimuli.

In this
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regard, Mandler’s approach appears to account well for
the linguistic/perceptual context effects described
above .
If however one were to accept the data driven/
conceptually driven account of implicit and explicit
memory, it would not necessarily change the practical
implications of the findings presented here.

It appears

that when depressives are asked to mentally construct a
previous episode (conceptually driven task), they have
more difficulty constructing a positive episode than
nondepressed individuals.

However, when partial data

are presented to a depressed individual (data driven
task), they are not as likely to produce mood congruent
information as in the conceptually driven situation.
Thus, it is the conceptually driven situation that tends
to more readily show the MCM effect.

This approach

would still appear to support the interpretation that
MCM in depression appears to rely less on automatic
processes, and more on cognitive operations such as
elaboration.

Conceptually driven tests by definition

involve more elaborative processes because elaboration
refers to the extent a memory is associated with other
items in memory and conceptually driven tests ask the
subject to reconstruct a previous episode which must
involve associations to other memories.

Thus,

it
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appears that if one opts for the data driven/
conceptually driven account of implicit/explicit memory,
it does not significantly endanger the elaboration
interpretat ion.
The findings of this study also relate to Beck’s
cognitive theory of depression and anxiety (Beck, 1967;
Beck & Emery, 1985; Beck et a l ., 1979).

As stated

earlier, the finding that depressives showed an explicit
MCM bias with depressed related words, but not with
those related to physical threat supports his notion of
cognitive content specificity.

However, Beck’s theory

suggests that the main differences between depression
and anxiety relate to cognitive content.

Data are now

converging to suggest important cognitive process
differences in addition to differences in cognitive
content.

As reviewed earlier, mood congruent attention

allocation biases have been found with anxiety subjects
but not with depressives (McCloud et a l ., 1986; Gotlib
et a l ., 1988).

In addition, implicit memory bias has

been demonstrated with anxiety patients, but generally
researchers have failed to find an explicit MCM bias in
anxiety subjects (e.g. Mathews et a l ., 1989).

As

demonstrated in this study, depressives show the
opposite pattern in that they have an explicit MCM bias,
but no implicit MCM bias.

Beck’s cognitive theory of
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emotional disorders does not account well for these
findings.

In addition,

it does not appear to follow

from Beck’s account of depression that MCM biases would
be found with one type of memory, but would not be found
in another type of memory.

Thus,

it appears that Beck’s

theory is at least incomplete.
Williams, Watts, MacLoed, and Mathews (1988) have
offered a cognitive theory of anxiety and depression
t.hat. appears to predict the findings of the current
study well.

Following the framework of Mandler,

they

proposed that because of the functional properties of
anxiety, cognitive resources are allocated more at the
preattentive stage which includes attention allocation
and perceptual memory or priming.

On the other hand,

they suggest that in depression cognitive resources are
allocated more toward mood congruency in the elaboration
stage which is presumed to follow the preattentive
stage.

Thus, the finding here that depressives show a

mood congruent bias in explicit memory but not in
implicit memory, directly supports this cognitive model
of depression.
As one may recall, Mandler argues that implicit
memory is more reflective of automatic processes, while
more control procedures are involved in explicit
memory.

Thus, these findings imply that MCM bias .is not
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a completely automatic phenomena and controlled
processes may be involved.

This raises questions as to

the appropriateness of Beck’s use of the term "automatic
thought".

In brief, Beck argues that depressed mood is

the result of automatic thoughts which result from the
activation of the depressogenic schemata which is
reflected in dysfunctional attitudes.

Beck’s use of

"automatic" is not clearly specified, although he seems
to imply that the thought is not voluntary, or the
patient does not ’try to think’ these thoughts.

It. does

not appear that Beck’s use of the term "automatic
thought" directly corresponds to the construct of
automatic as it is used in cognitive psychology.

The

results here suggest that controlled procedures may be
involved in the negative thinking or memory of
depressives.

Thus, the concept of "automatic thought"

appears to need further operationalization, and this may
help to determine the exact nature of the negative
thinking bias in depression.

This theory development

would direct future research into cognitive processes in
depression, and may have important treatment
implications as well.
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Conclusions

This study found a MCM bias in explicit memory, but
no such memory bias in implicit memory for depression.
Thus, although depression makes mood congruent memories
more retrievable, they are not necessarily more
accessible.

Seen in a different framework, when asked

to mentally reconstruct a previous episode (conceptually
driven task), depressives tend to recall mood congruent
memories.

However, when asked to produce responses to

perceptual stimuli, depressives do not respond
frequently with recently learned mood congruent
information.

The results of this study suggest that the

primary mechanism for the explicit MCM bias found is
elaboration.

The pattern of results did not support

ease of activation, or response bias accounts of MCM.
In addition, the lack of association between explicit
MCM and implicit MCM implies that these two forms of
memory bias do not share the same cognitive processes.
If MCM proves to be an important maintenance mechanism
in depression, the results here imply that cognitive
elaboration may best explain why depressives bias their
memory toward negative material.

It is possible that

cognitive and other treatments for depression are
effective in that they interfere with, or modify this
elaborative process, which lends depressed information
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less retrievable thus resulting in the relief of
depressed emotion.

If future research corroborates

cognitive elaboration as a critical mechanism underlying
MCM, then treatment approaches to depression may be
enhanced by investigating more effective ways to modify
this elabonative process.
Several suggestions may be made for future
research.

Further investigation of encoding processes

and their effect on implicit and explicit memory may
also shed light, on the mechanisms under! ving MCM.

The

results here w'ould predict that encouraging elaboration
in encoding would enhance the mood congruent effect.
The encoding task used here encouraged elaboration.
Manipulation of encoding (e.g. semantic versus
structural) may help us better understand the importance
of elaboration in MCM.

The manipulation of retrieval

strategies may also shed light on the process of MCM
(e.g. Anderson & Pichert, , 1978).

Secondly,

future

research should attempt to disentangle the participation
of mood in MCM, and other valuables such as
neuroticism.

Related to this, the results here may

suggest the importance of rumination in depressed MCM.
Thus, further operationalization of rumination and
elaboration is needed so that future research can
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identify these cognitive mechanisms and further
investigate their importance in MCM.
This study showed that MCM is found in explicit
memory but not in implicit memory.

This finding

supports the suggestion that elaborative mechanisms may
be an important variable underlying explicit MCM bias.
Thus, future research should use other methodologies to
investigate the participation of elaboration in MCM.

1

further progress is made in identifying this cognitive
mechanism, and this mechanism proves to be important in
MCM, cognitive treatments of depression may be improved
by determining treatment strategies that may more
effectively intervene in this process.
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STIMULUS LIST

I

POSITIVE

A

B

C

N E U T R A L ______ I

DEPRESSED

IP H Y S I C A L T H R E A T I

c a l m (35)
p o i se (6)
l i v e ly (26)
c o m fort (43)
c h e e rfu l (10)
c r e a t iv e (49)
d i l igent (2)
v i v a c i o u s (3)

p o s t (84)
p e a r (8)
p o w d er (28)
b o u lder (11)
n u t m eg (4)
p u r c h a s e (47)
l a t itude (5)
s t o r e r o o m (1)

p a n ic (22)
a l o ne (19 5)
s t u p id (24)
d e f e a t (31)
r e g r et (9)
d e s p ised (3)
c r i t i c i z e (4)
d i s a p p ro v e (4)

s t a b (3)
v i c t i m (27)
c a n c er (25)
f u n eral (33)
a s s a ult (15)
c o l l a pse (7)
m u t ilate (3)
i n cu r a b l e (2)

t r u st (52)
b l i ss (4)
e l a ted (3 )
p r o s p er (3)
d e c i sive (19 )
c a r e f re e (9)
r e a s sure (5)
r e f r e s h e d (5)

b r o w n (176)
f r i nge (16)
c r u ise (2)
s h a m p o o (2)
c i r c u i t (23)
w a r d r o b e (8)
c a t a l o g u e (8)
c h r o n i c 1e (5)

f a i l (37)
d r e a d (9 )
r e m orse (1)
g u i lty (29)
h o p e le s s (14)
dejorived (8)
1 ist l es s (1)
p e r s e c u te (3)

h a r m (25)
fatal (19)
h e a rse (1)
a t t ack (105)
f r a c ture (1)
c o r o n a r y (7)
a m b u l a nc e (6)
s u f f o c a t e (5)

r e l a x (19)
s e c ure (30 )
s e r ene (10)
r e s p ect (125)
r e j oice (1)
d e l i g ht (29)
t r a n q u i l (2)
conf i dent (16)

b a t h (26)
t r a c t (17)
s h o wer (15)
a u t hor (46)
m o l e c ul e (6)
c o s tu me (10)
f o r e head (16)
p e n i nsu la (9)

e m p ty (64)
s c o r n (4)
i n s u lt (7 )
b e a t en (15)
h o s ti le (19)
i n f e r lor (7)
i m p o t e nt (2)
w o r t h l e s s (3)

pa in (88)
w o u nd (28)
lethal (5)
c o f f in (7)
s t r a n gle (6)
a c c ident (41)
c a s u a l t y (3)
p a r a lysis (6)

T he a b o v e
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stimuli

u se d

In t he d e s c r i b e d

experiment.

Word
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four

letter
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an d w o r d
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word
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Responses

Mood
Acceptable

r e s p o n s es

for

c a l ____________ calm,

p r e s e n t e d word

calmed,

p o l ____________ poise,
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ca lming,
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stems.

calmly

poise d

l iv ____________ lively,

li vl i e st

c o m ____________ comfort,

co mf or te d,

com fo rt in g,

t a l ____________ talented,

tal en t

e r e ____________ creative,

creativity

t r a n __________

tranquility

tranquil,

v i v ____________ vivaci ous ,

comfortable

vivaciously

p o s ____________ post
p e a ____________ pear
p o w ____________ powder,

powdered,

b o u ____________ boulder,

powdering

b ou lde re d,

bouldering

n u t ____________ nut me g
p u r ____________ purchase,

p ur cha se d,

purchasing

lat____________ latitude
t e l e __________

te lescope,

p a n ____________ panic,

te l es co pe d,

paniced,

telescoping

panicing

a l o ____________ alone
s t u ____________ stupid,

stupidity

d e f e ___________ defeat,

defe at ed,

r e g ____________ regret,

re gre tfu l,

inf e ___________ inferior,
c r i ____________ cr iticize,

defeating
r e gr ett ing ,

re g r e t t e d

inferiority
c r it ici zed ,

c r it ic iz in g,

cri ti ca l

Mood C o n g r u e n t
d i s a ____________ d i s a p p ro v e ,

disapproved,

Memory

disapproving,

d i sap pro va l
s t a ____________ stab,

stabbed,

v i e ____________ victim,

stabbing

victimized

c a n ____________ cancer
f u n ____________ funeral
a s s ____________ assault,

assaulted,

c o l l ___________ collapse,

collapsed

m u t ____________ mu tilate,
incu

m u t i la te d,

assaulting,

assaultive

mutilating

inc urable

t r u ____________ trust,

tru ste d,

b l i ____________ bliss,

trus ti ng,

trustworthy

bl i s s f u l

e l a ____________ elated,

elate

p r o s ___________ prosper,

p r o s pe re d,

d e c i ___________ decisi ve ,

pro sp er in g,

prosperity

decisiveness

c a r ____________ ca re f r e e
r e a s ___________ reassure,

rea ss u r ed ,

r e f ____________ refre sh ed ,

refresh,

s t o ____________ story,

st or i e d

f r i ____________ fringe,

fringed,

c r u ____________ cruise,

cruised ,

reassuring
refreshing

f r i n g i ng
cruis ing ,

cr ui se r

s h a ____________ shampoo,

shampooing,

shampooed

c i r ____________ circuit,

circuiting,

circuited
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s a n ____________ sandwich, s a n d w i c h e s
f o r ____________ forehead,

fore he ad s

c h r o ___________ chronicle,

chronicled

w e a ____________ weak,

weaken,

d r e a ___________ dread,

dre ade d,

r e m ____________ remorse,

weakening

dread ing ,

dreadful

remorseful

h o p ____________ hopeless,
g u i ____________ guilty,

weak en ed,

hopelessness

gu il t

d e p ____________ de prived,

de prive,

depriving

l i s ____________ listless, l i s t l e s s n e s s
p e r s ___________ persecute,
h a r ____________ harm,

p e rs ec ut in g,

harmed,

fat ____________ fatal,

h a rm i n g

fatality,

h e a ____________ hearse,

he ar s t

a t t ____________ attack,

a tt ack ed,

fr a c ___________ fracture,

persecuted

fatally

(?)
attacking

fractured,

fracturing

c o r ____________ c o r o n a r y
a m b ____________ a m b u l a nc e
s u f ____________ suffo cat e,

r e l a ___________ relax,

su ff oc a ti ng ,

rel axed,

s e c ____________ secure,
r e s ____________ respect,

relaxing

sec ured,

securing

re spe cte d,

respectfully
s e r ____________ serene,

suffocated

serenity

r e sp ect ing ,

re s pe ct fu l,
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r e j ____________ rejoice,

rejoiced,

d e l i ___________ delight,

d e lig ht ed,

d i l ____________ di ligent,

rejoicing
d e li ght ful ,

delighting

diligently

c o n f ___________ confi de nt,

confidently

b a t ____________ bath,

bathing,

bathed

t r a i ___________trail,

trailed,

tr ai l i ng

a u t ____________ author,

auth or ed,

authoring

sh o ____________ shower,

sh owered,

showering

m o l e __________
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molecule

c o s ____________ costume,

costu mi ng,

p u b ____________ p ub li she r,

co st u m ed

pu bl ishing,

published,

p u bli sh ing s,

publishers
lnt e ___________ interpret,

Interpreting,

interpreted,

in ter pr e ts
e m p ____________ empty,

emp tied,

e m p t y i ng

s c o ____________ scorn,

sco rned,

scorning

b e a ____________ beaten,
insu___________ insult,

beat,

be ati ng

insulted,

in sulting

h o s ____________ hostile,

hostility

d e s p ___________ de spised,

despise,

d es pi si ng ,

impo___________ impotent
w o r ____________ wo rth le s s,
p a i ____________ pain,
w o u ____________ wound,
cof f___________ c off in

worthlessness

pai ne d
wounded,

wounding

despicable

Mood C o n g r u e n t M e m o r y
le t ____________ lethal,

lethality

s t r a ___________ strangle,
a c c ____________ ac cident,

strangled,

strangling

accidentally

c a s ____________ c a s u a l t y
p a r a ___________ paralys is,

paraly ze d,

paralyzing
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